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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the future liabilities that the Ugandan Public Service 
Pensions Fund might accumulate under the provisions of CAP 286, unless 
it is reformed.  It then discusses alternative reform options that can be used 
as input in designing an educated homegrown reform of the fund.  The 
paper supports a hybrid (two-pillar) reform option composed by a small 
defined benefit scheme and a complementary defined contribution scheme, 
instead of a pure defined contribution (monopillar) reform option 
discussed by policymakers in the country. The main reason for this is 
related to the fact that hybrid and pure defined contribution reforms will 
have the same impact on reducing pension expenditure (for same 
grandfathering rules and surplus in the first pillar).  In addition, everything 
else being equal, the hybrid reform is likely to produce higher average 
replacement rates due to the redistributive and pooling properties of the 
small DB pillar. 
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PENSIONS TERMINOLOGY  
Accrual replacement rate  The rate at which pension entitlement is built up 
relative to wages (in earning-related schemes) 
Defined benefit  Benefit based on a prescribed formula 
Funding  Accumulation of assets in advance to meet future 
pension liabilities 
Implicit pension debt (IPD) 
Liabilities accrued to date calculated as the present 
value of future payments for all contributors and 
beneficiaries based on length of service at the time 
of measurement using projected wages. 
Indexation  Increases in benefits by reference to an index, 
usually of prices, or average earnings 
Length of service (LOS)  Number of years a worker has contributed to a 
system 
Old-Age dependency ratio  The ratio of older persons to working-age individuals 
PAYG (Pay-as-you-go) system 
A method of financing whereby current pension 
expenditures are paid out of current revenues from 
contributions (payroll taxes) 
Pensions contribution rate 
Payroll tax as percentage of an individual gross 
wage for a pensions scheme 
Pension coverage rate 
The number of workers actively contributing to a 
publicly mandated contributory retirement scheme, 
divided by the estimated labour force or by the 
working-age population 
Pension spending  Defined here as old-age, survivor, and disability 
payments 
Pension coverage rate 
The number of workers actively contributing to a 
publicly mandated contributory retirement scheme, 
divided by the estimated labour force or by the 
working-age population 
Required contribution rate 
This is the rate at which contributions have to be 
made (regardless of whether it is levied against the 
employee or employer) in order to avoid subsidy 
from any external source of funding (including 
drawing down the reserve) and is often expressed 
as a percentage of wage bill.   
Replacement Rate 
The value of a pension as a proportion of a worker’s 
wage during a base period, such as last year or 
three years or fifteen or entire lifetime average wage 
. It also denotes, as another definition, the average 
pension of a group of pensioners as a proportion of 
the average wage of the group 
System dependency ratio 
The ratio of persons receiving pensions from a 
certain pension scheme divided by the number of 
workers contributing to the same scheme in the 
same period 
System maturation 
The process in which young people who are eligible 
for pensions, in a new system, gradually grow old 
and retire, thereby raising the system dependency 
ratio to the demographic dependency ratio. In a fully 
mature system, all old people in the covered group 
are eligible for full pensions 
Wage base 
The portion of remuneration on which pension 
benefits are calculated. Number of last years for 
wage base calculation indicates the number of years 
(average annual wages) that should be considered 
as wage base  An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 5 -   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 2 
Abbreviations and acronyms............................................................................................... 3 
Pensions terminology.......................................................................................................... 4 
Table of contents................................................................................................................. 5 
List of figures...................................................................................................................... 7 
List of tables...................................................................................................................... 10 
Executive summary........................................................................................................... 11 
Key characteristics of the PSPF.................................................................................... 11 
The need for reforming the PSPF................................................................................. 14 
Conclusions and policy recommendations.................................................................... 14 
Introduction....................................................................................................................... 19 
I  The Ugandan pension system and the reform agenda .............................................. 21 
II  The Public Service Pension Scheme......................................................................... 24 
II.A Coverage........................................................................................................... 24 
II.B  Old age pension................................................................................................. 24 
II.C Survivors’  pensions........................................................................................... 25 
II.D Other  gratuities.................................................................................................. 26 
III  Information on covered populations..................................................................... 28 
III.A Data  availability................................................................................................ 28 
III.B  Information on the stock of active employees.................................................. 29 
III.C  Information on the stock of retirees.................................................................. 32 
III.D  Estimated key indicators for 2003/2004........................................................... 36 
IV  The baseline projections ....................................................................................... 36 
IV.A  Projected system dependency rate................................................................ 37 
IV.B Projected  benefits.............................................................................................. 39 
IV.C  Projected system expenditure ........................................................................... 40 
IV.D Required  contribution  rate............................................................................ 42 
IV.E  Implicit pension debt and financing gap........................................................... 45 
IV.F  The role of the recruitment assumptions in baseline projections...................... 47 
V  Options for reform.................................................................................................... 48 
V.A  Transforming PSPF into provident fund (Reform I)......................................... 49 
V.A.1 Reform  I.1................................................................................................. 50 
V.A.2  Reforms I.2 and I.3................................................................................... 58 
V.B  Transforming PSPF into a mixed scheme (Reform II)..................................... 65 
V.B.1 Reform  II.1................................................................................................ 65 
V.B.2 Reform  II.2................................................................................................ 67 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations...................................................................... 71 
Reforming the PSPF into a pure provident................................................................... 73 
Reforming the PSPF into a two pillar scheme.............................................................. 74 
Other important considerations................................................................................. 77 
References......................................................................................................................... 78 
APPENDIX A Projection methodology and key assumptions......................................... 79 
APPENDIX B International experience on public service pensions arrangements ......... 90 
APPENDIX C Implicit pension debt: cross country comparison..................................... 93 Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
     
  - 6 - 
APPENDIX D Overview of PROST 12........................................................................... 97 
APPENDIX E Impact of Reforms on Individuals.......................................................... 100 
APPENDIX F Impact of Wage Indexation..................................................................... 107 
 An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 7 -   
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: More than 50% of civil servants are men between the ages of 30 and 50 * ..... 30 
Figure 2: More than 30% of all teachers are women between the ages of 17 and 60 *.... 30 
Figure 3: On average civil servants wages increase with age for both men and women *
................................................................................................................................... 31 
Figure 4: On average teacher wages slightly increase with age for both men and women
................................................................................................................................... 32 
Figure 5: Almost 90% of government retirees are men between the ages of 42 and 90 .. 33 
Figure 6: 72% of teacher retirees are men between the ages of 42 and 90*..................... 34 
Figure 7: Age and gender distribution of the stock of civil servant retirees (2003/04, 
thous.  persons)......................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 8: Age and gender distribution of the stock of teacher retirees (2003/04, thous.  
persons)..................................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 9: Projections of civil servant dependency rates* under two alternative mortality 
assumptions............................................................................................................... 37 
Figure 10: Projections of teacher dependency rates* under two alternative mortality 
assumptions show an increase, particularly starting in 2050.................................... 38 
Figure 11: Projected average replacement rates* for the stock of retirees (reduced pension 
only) are decreasing over time.................................................................................. 40 
Figure 12: Projected pension expenditure for civil servants (% of GDP) is quite constant 
but exponentially increasing starting around 2040................................................... 41 
Figure 13: Projected pension expenditure for teachers (% of GDP) is only increasing 
during the entire simulation period........................................................................... 41 
Figure 14: Required contribution rate needed to balance the scheme under two alternative 
mortality assumptions for civil servants................................................................... 43 
Figure 15: Required contribution rate needed to balance the scheme under two alternative 
mortality assumptions for teachers........................................................................... 44 
Figure 16: Projected implicit pension debt* for civil servants (% of GDP) increases 
exponentially starting around 2030........................................................................... 46 
Figure 17: Projected implicit pension* debt for teachers (% of GDP) only increases 
during the entire simulation period........................................................................... 46 
Figure 18: Pure DC reform with immediate switching decreases considerably 
Government expenditure for civil servants, particularly in the medium and long term
................................................................................................................................... 52 
Figure 19: Pure DC reform with immediate switching decreases considerably government 
expenditure for teachers, except for the very few first years of the simulation period*
................................................................................................................................... 52 
Figure 20: Payment of accrued rights and contributions for civil servants – Reform I.1A 
(% of GDP)............................................................................................................... 53 
Figure 21: Payment of accrued rights and contributions for teachers – Reform I.1A (% of 
GDP)......................................................................................................................... 54 
Figure 22: In a pure DC reform with immediate switching replacement rates* for stock of 
retirees for civil servants are lower than in the baseline scenario**......................... 55 Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
     
  - 8 - 
Figure 23: In a pure DC reform with immediate switching replacement rates* for stock of 
retirees for teachers will be lower than in the baseline scenario**........................... 56 
Figure 24: In a pure DC reform, rate of return on assets makes a big difference on the 
replacement rates* in the DC component for civil servants**................................. 57 
Figure 25: In a pure DC reform, rate of return on assets makes a big difference on the 
replacement rates* in the DC component for teachers** ......................................... 58 
Figure 26: Pure DC reforms make Government expenditure for civil servants much lower 
than in baseline scenario but comparable with hybrid reform*................................ 59 
Figure 27: Pure DC reforms make Government expenditure for teachers much lower than 
in the baseline scenario*........................................................................................... 60 
Figure 28: In a pure DC reform for only new entrants, replacement rates* , for non 
switchers are higher than for switchers**................................................................. 61 
Figure 29: In a pure DC reform for only new entrants replacement rates*  for non-
switchers are higher than for switchers**................................................................. 62 
Figure 30: Price indexation lowers Government expenditure for civil servants more than 
wage indexation does**............................................................................................ 63 
Figure 31: Price indexation lowers Government expenditure for teachers more than wage 
indexation does......................................................................................................... 63 
Figure 32: Price indexation is another way to gradually decreasing replacement rates* for 
civil servants and reduce the fiscal impact of the current scheme**........................ 64 
Figure 33: Price indexation is another way to gradually decreasing replacement rates* for 
teachers and reduce the fiscal impact of the current scheme**................................ 65 
Figure 34: Hybrid reforms lowers Government expenditure for civil servants but 
expenditures patterns are identical to the pure DC reform*..................................... 68 
Figure 35: Hybrid reforms lowers Government expenditure for teachers but expenditures 
patterns are identical to the pure DC reform*........................................................... 69 
Figure 36: Comparison of replacement rates* for civil servant switchers– Reform II.2 
with Reform I.2......................................................................................................... 70 
Figure 37: Comparison of replacement rates* for teacher switchers– Reform II.2 with 
Reform I.2................................................................................................................. 71 
Figure 38: Projected civil servants average wage (% of economy wide average wage).. 81 
Figure 39: Projected number of active employees (thous.  persons)................................ 85 
Figure 40: Assumed age and gender distribution of new civil servants (% of new recruits)
................................................................................................................................... 86 
Figure 41: Assumed age and gender distribution of new teacher (% of new recruits)..... 86 
Figure 42: Age specific retirement probabilities* for civil servants................................. 87 
Figure 43: Projected number of beneficiaries (thous.  persons) ....................................... 88 
Figure 44: Assumed number of years of service at retirement......................................... 89 
Figure 45: Projected Pension Entitlements as a Proportion of the Average Wage  under 
No-Reform Scenario............................................................................................... 102 
Figure 46: Projected Pension Entitlements as a Proportion of the Average Wage  under 
the Reform Scenarios.............................................................................................. 102 
Figure 47: Post reform Relative Pension Levels as a share of No-Reform Relative 
Pension Levels........................................................................................................ 103 
Figure 48: Pension Wealth as a Portion of No-reform Pension Wealth......................... 104 An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 9 -   
Figure 49: Projected average replacement rates* for the stock of retirees (reduced pension 
only)........................................................................................................................ 107 
Figure 50: Projected pension expenditure (% of GDP).................................................. 107 
Figure 51: Projected implicit pension debt* (% of GDP)............................................... 108 
 
 Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
     
  - 10 - 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Summary of key PSPF indicators, 2003/04........................................................ 12 
Table 2: Summary policy considerations under alternative reform options / 1................ 15 
Table 3: The Uganda pension system............................................................................... 21 
Table 4: Government pension arrears............................................................................... 23 
Table 5: Benefit Types under CAP 286............................................................................ 27 
Table 6: Summary of data on the stock of employees, 2003/04....................................... 29 
Table 7: Summary of data on the stock of old age pensioners (2003/04)......................... 33 
Table 8: Main pension system indicators (2003/04)......................................................... 36 
Table 9: Projected total pension expenditure (baseline: variant 1)................................... 42 
Table 10: The impact of lower covered population growth rates on end of simulation 
period results............................................................................................................. 48 
Table 11: Alternative scenarios under the pure DC and hybrid reform options............... 49 
Table 12: Projected average replacement rates* for the stock of retirees (average over 
2070 – 2075)............................................................................................................. 67 
Table 13: Summary policy considerations under alternative reform options / 1.............. 72 
Table 14: Summary of the key outputs for alternative scenarios...................................... 76 
Table 15: Macroeconomic assumptions............................................................................ 80 
Table 16: Assumed average wage growth for the covered population............................. 80 
Table 17: Projected life expectancy* for the general population ..................................... 82 
Table 18: Projected life expectancy for civil servants...................................................... 83 
Table 19: Medium term active population growth assumptions....................................... 84 
Table 20: Public debt, pension spending and implicit pension debt for 35 low and middle 
income countries for various years during the end-1990s and 2000 ........................ 94 
Table 21: Estimated IPD for 35 Low and Middle Income Countries - detailed results.... 96 
Table 22: Projected Internal Rates of Return.................................................................. 105 
 
 An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 11 -   
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper discusses the results of simulations conducted to project future Government 
liabilities stemming from the provision of the Pensions Act (CAP 286).  It also discusses 
options for reforming the Public Service Pension Fund (PSPF).  The projections were 
generated with the World Bank Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit (PROST) 
model, version 12.   
The paper builds on Deloitte and Touche (2001) and improves it in the following way: 1) 
it presents the demographic, macroeconomic, and recruitment policy assumptions used in 
the projections to facilitate replication of results; 2) it updates the assumptions needed for 
the projections by using the latest policy documents such as MPS (2001, 2003 and 2005) 
and GOU (2005); 3) it expands the analysis to also include civil servants outside the 
central government; and 4) it separates survivors from old age retirees. 
In this executive summary we report some of the analysis made in the rest of the paper.  
All results reported critically depend on assumptions that cannot be adequately 
summarized here.  For this reason the executive summary should not be read in isolation 
from the main paper and its appendices. 
Key characteristics of the PSPF 
The PSPF, regulated by CAP 286, is a non-contributory final salary defined benefit 
scheme covering traditional civil servants, civil servants in local authorities (districts, 
municipalities, town councils) and primary and secondary school teachers.  Traditional 
civil servants include public employees in the central government, police officers, prison 
officers, doctors and public employees in the judiciary branch.   
The MPS is responsible for administering benefit payments to individuals covered by 
CAP 286 and for administering benefit payment for the Armed Forces personnel as 
provided for by CAP 298.  It is also responsible for record keeping of personnel data for 
active employers among traditional civil servants and teachers. 
CAP 286 provides for old age defined pension benefits that can be partly commuted into 
a pension gratuity at retirement using a mechanistic formula disconnected from a proper 
actuarial evaluation; and for survivor’s pension payable to orphans, widows and 
widowers and equivalent to 100% of the pension entitlement of the deceased public 
officers.  CAP 286 also provides for gratuities for public officers serving on contract, for 
death, marriage, for police and prisons officers, and for short service. 
The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the PSPF.  The teachers and 
civil servants populations are very different.  For the base year of our projections 
(2003/2004) the PSPF covered approximately 70,000 civil servants and 141,000 teacher 
employees and 13,000 civil servants and 11,000 teacher retirees globally accounting for 
only 1% of the Ugandan population.  The civil servants employee population is on 
average older and with lower female participation.  However teacher retirees are on 
average older and with a higher female participation.  Average wage and average 
pensions are higher for civil servants than for teachers, irrespectively of gender 
considerations.  The different population characteristics result in very different system 
dependency ratios: 29.1% for civil servants and 8.2% for teachers.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Table 1: Summary of key PSPF indicators, 2003/04 
Covered working population  Unit  Civil servants   Teachers  
Number of men employees  1,000  50.212  94.211 
Number of women employees  1,000 19.492  47.221 
Number of employees  1,000 69.704  141.432 
Average age of men employees  1,000  39.66  36.03 
Average age of women employees  1,000 37.80  33.03 
Average age of employees  1,000 39.14  35.03 
Average annual salary of men  1,000  2,862.3  2,176.3 
Average annual salary of women  1,000 2,701.2  1,851.4 
Average annual salary  1,000 2,817.4  2,067.9 
Covered retired population    Civil Servants   Teachers  
Number of men retirees  1,000  12.155  8.297 
Number of women retirees  1,000 1.367  2.765 
Number of retirees  1,000 13.521  11.062 
Average age of men retirees  1,000  64.5  70.1 
Average age of women retirees  1,000 62.6  68.0 
Average age of retirees  1,000 64.3  69.6 
Average annual pension of men /1  1,000  2,301.7  1,945.3 
Average annual pension of women /1  1,000 1,801.1  1,198.3 
Average annual pension /1  1,000 2,248.5  1,758.6 
Other indicators    Civil Servants  Teachers 
System dependency ratio /2  %  29.1  8.2 
Estimated total expenditure /3  UGS mln 71,180  48,831 
Of which:       
   exp.  for old-age pensioners (regular pensions)  UGS mln 30,358  19,054 
   exp.  for old-age pensioners (CPG payments)  UGS mln 25,000  25,000 
   exp.  for survivors (regular pensions)  UGS mln 5,145  870 
Other payments (non-CPG gratuities, etc.) /4  UGS mln 10,677  3,907 
Total expenditure as % of GDP  %  0.59  0.40 
Average old age pension replacement rates /5  %  79.7  83.4 
Memo Items       
GDP UGS  mln 12,121,000 
Population 1  23,443,052 
Notes: /1 this includes only annuities from reduced and full pensions; /2 number of all beneficiaries divided by the 
number of active employees; /3 due to be paid in 2003/2004 excluding eventual arrears; /4 MPS experts’ estimates; /5 
average pension divided by the average covered wage (i.e., the wage received by active teachers or civil servant 
employees).  Notice that this refers to only the reduced pension and excludes the CPG: i.e., 1/3 of full pension for the 
first 15 years of retirement. 
Source: MPS, MOFPED. 
The system dependency ratios are very low and would suggest that if the PSPF were to 
become a contributory scheme, it could become financially balanced with a relatively low 
contribution rate.  However this first observation is not supported by a more careful 
analysis of the generosity of the scheme and long term trends in key indicators. 
The system is rather generous by international standards.  Individuals can retire at the 
early age of 45, vesting periods of only 10 years are considered low, the benefit accrual An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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rate is high at 2.4% per year, the reference wage for pension calculations is the last salary 
and benefits are indexed to wages. 
In addition, in the next 70 years, system dependency rates are projected to increase from 
23% to 35-40% for civil servants and from 80% to 40-45% for teachers.  The higher 
increase for teachers is mainly driven by the two following factors: 1) the teacher sub-
scheme is a much younger scheme and with maturation it ages more quickly than the 
more mature civil servant sub-scheme; and 2) the teacher population is expected to grow 
at a lower rate than the civil servant population. 
As a consequence of the relatively generosity of the scheme and the expected 
deterioration of the system dependency ratio, system expenditure in the next 70 years is 
projected to grow from the current 0.6% and 0.4% of GDP per year to about 2.2% and 
2.3% of GDP per year for civil servants and teachers, respectively. 
The required contribution rate is a more intuitive indicator to measure the relatively 
generosity of the system.  The required contribution rate assumes that the system is made 
contributory (but unreformed) and it is the required rate to make the system financially 
balanced.  In other words, so that the volume of contributions to the fund equals the 
projected benefit outflows on a cash flow basis every year.   
The required contribution rate for the civil servants sub-scheme starts from already a very 
high level of 36% which would not be sustainable even in a developed economy.  Over 
time, it increases driven by the changes in the system dependency rate and it reaches 
around 40% by the end of the simulation period.  The required contribution rate for the 
teachers’ sub-scheme starts at the much lower level of 18% much due to the much lower 
starting dependency rate.  However, by the end of the simulation period exceeds the one 
projected for civil servants reaching about 45%. 
A final measure of the generosity and hence, fiscal impact, of the PSPF scheme is given 
by the implicit pension debt (IPD).  The IPD calculated in this paper measures the 
accrued-to-date liabilities of the system if the system were to be closed at the time of 
measurement.  For the base year, the total liabilities accrued by the system in both the 
civil servant and teacher sub-schemes are estimated at 23% and 27% of GDP 
respectively.  Towards the end of the simulation period the combined IPD for the two 
sub-schemes is projected to reach 100% and 110% of GDP. 
Notice that since the PSPF is non contributory, the IPD can also be interpreted as a 
measure of the redistributive property of the scheme from general population to the 
covered population.  For the base year the covered population is 1% of the Ugandan 
population and it benefits (in present value terms) from a subsidy equivalent to 50% of 
GDP.  Towards the end of the simulation period, the covered population is 2% of the 
Ugandan population and it benefits (in present value terms) from a subsidy equivalent to 
100% of GDP. 
It has to be noted that IPD calculations are highly sensitive to the choice of discount 
factor.  For our calculations we used a rather generous 5% real discount rates.  If more 
conservative measures were to be used the IPD estimates would be higher. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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The need for reforming the PSPF 
The need for reforming the PSPF stems from the inability of rebalancing the scheme by 
simply making it contributory.  Two main reform options are analyzed in the paper: 1) a 
systemic reform transforming the current scheme into a mono pillar pure provident fund; 
and 2) a systemic reform transforming the current scheme into a two pillar scheme 
maintaining a reformed and small defined benefit component and a larger defined 
contribution (or provident fund) component.  We call the first reform “pure DC”, 
“monopillar” or “provident fund” reform while we call the second reform “hybrid” or 
“two-pillar” reform. 
In both reforms the new scheme is made contributory with a 15% contribution rate; 5% 
paid by employees and 10% paid by the employer (i.e., by the tax payer).  The 
contribution rate was calibrated to maximize the fiscal impact of the reforms while 
providing adequate benefits in the vast majority of the scenarios presented and at the 
same time be sustainable in the long run. 
Target expected replacement rates have been lowered to around 40-50% in the new 
scheme.  How much lifetime earnings should be replaced on a mandatory basis should 
depend on a number of factors that are specific to the conditions in which the reform is 
undertaken.  These include access to housing, health care, and other basic services, 
average propensity to save, the level of development, and the level of income in the 
country.  International experience generally indicates that for a typical, full-career 
worker, an initial target of net-of-tax income replacement from mandatory systems is 
likely to be about 40 percent of real earnings to maintain subsistence levels of income in 
retirement .  Lower-income workers will require somewhat higher rates while higher-
income workers require lower levels.  The age at retirement will also affect the measure 
of adequacy, with older workers requiring higher replacements rates because they have 
little potential to supplement pension benefits.  Targeting average replacement rates 
above 60 percent is not likely to be viable over the long term because the required 
contribution rates would impose an untenable burden. 
Two important policy choices need to be taken in the reform: 1) whether the new scheme 
will be open only to new entrants or also for the current working population; and 2) 
whether benefit indexation for current and future workers is changed or not.  Another 
meaningful variation that is considered in the paper is whether the returns on assets 
accumulated are likely to be high or low.  In the main body of the paper we detail all 
these different scenarios and combinations. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The two main reform options of reforming the PSPF into either a pure provident fund or a 
hybrid two pillar scheme have both different advantages and disadvantages.  In addition 
they also entail different types of risk summarized in the next table and discussed in the 
reminder of this section.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Table 2: Summary policy considerations under alternative reform options / 1 
Fiscal 
impact 
Fully contributory reform.  The pure provident fund reform with immediate switching and price 
indexation for switchers has the strongest impact on government expenditure, identical to the 
hybrid with same grandfathering rules.  Tax revenues will only needed to pay for wages, 10% of 
contributions, and accrued rights under the old scheme.  Government expenditure is expected to 
decrease in the short term and to increase again to about 1% of GDP in the long run.  If more 




The pure provident fund reform with immediate switching and price indexation for switchers 
reduces average expected replacement rates more than the hybrid reform with same 
grandfathering rules.  These are expected to fall rapidly to around 42% for civil servants and 33% 
for teachers in the high interest rate scenario of 5% real for the next 70 years.  If more generous 
grandfathering rules are adopted, average replacement rates will increase proportionally but only in 





































Weak governance may expose accumulated funds to under political influence.  Under a more 
realistic scenario of 3% real return replacement rates are expected to fall to about 27% for civil 
servants and about 21% for teachers. 
 
Members fully bear investment risk. 
  
The scheme provides no longevity insurance.  In addition, if members  were to voluntarily 
annuitize cash balances, they would bear annuitization risk.  The current financial market institutions 
are unable to safely provide private sector annuities. 
 
The pure provident fund reform rapidly lowers expected replacement rates, thus not appealing 
to current workers, including members of Parliament. 
 
Capacity of MPS needs strengthening to forecast pension expenditure in the short run and manage 




Fully contributory reform.  The hybrid reform with immediate switching and price indexation for 
switchers has the strongest impact on government expenditure, identical to the pure provident 
fund reform with same grandfathering rules as long as the first pillar is not in deficit.  Tax 
revenues will only needed to pay for wages, 10% of contributions, and accrued rights under the old 
scheme.  Government expenditure is expected to lower in the short term and increase to again to 
about 1% of GDP in the long run.  If more generous grandfathering rules are adopted government 




Average expected replacement rates in the hybrid reform with immediate switching and price 
indexation for switchers are higher than in the pure provident fund reform with same 
grandfathering rules.  It will provide long run expected replacement of about 42% and about 40% for 


































Weak governance may expose accumulated funds to undue political influence.  Under a more 
realistic scenario of 3% real return on assets, replacement rates are expected to fall to about 34% for 
civil servants and 35% for teachers.  These are still higher than the expected replacement rates 
projected in the pure provident fund reform under the same interest rate scenario. 
 
DB parameters (benefit indexation, contribution ceiling indexation and benefit formula parameters) 
can be easily manipulated unless MPS develops strong modeling capacity to provide 
quantitative answers to policy reform alternatives. 
 
The hybrid reform provides a minimum longevity insurance unobtainable in the private sector. 
 
The hybrid reform reduces the exposure of members to investment risk. 
 
The hybrid reform ensures a more gradual transition to lower replacement rates, thus appealing 
more to current workers, including members of Parliament. 
  
Capacity of MPS needs strengthening to forecast pension expenditure in the short and long run for 
the DB component, will need to manage a more complex scheme including outsourcing of asset 
management 
 
Notes:  1/ This is a summary of 7 alternative reform options discussed in the text.  All numbers reported are indicative 
and would vary according to the specific scenario chosen.  We refer to the text for a complete discussion of all the 
results. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
     
  - 16 - 
Reforming the PSPF into a pure provident fund with immediate switching of current 
workers and price indexation of benefits for new retirees has the strongest impact in 
relieving fiscal pressure in the medium and long run.  Government expenditure is 
expected to remain constant at around 1% of GDP over the whole simulation period.  
Notice, however that the fiscal impact is identical under the hybrid reform option for 
same grandfathering rules. 
Reforming the PSPF into a pure provident fund with immediate switching of current 
workers and price indexation of benefits for new retirees has the strongest impact in 
reducing expected replacement rates.  In the high rate of return on assets scenario 
replacement rates for the flow of retirees gradually decrease to 60% of average wage in 
the long run, less in the low rate of return scenario.  Price indexation would further 
reduce replacement rates to 40% to 50% of average wage for the stock of retirees.  
Members of parliament, currently not covered by any scheme, will need to join the 
reformed scheme and may not support a reform that reduces benefits too rapidly.  Finally, 
current civil servants may oppose, through lobbying, and even stall the reform process 
while seeking a compromise between budget alleviation and pension adequacy. 
The provident fund option entails also some important risks.  Replacement rates purely 
depend on realized returns on accumulated assets.  A high rate of 5% real return on assets 
over the next 70 years is needed to support average replacement rates of 40% to 50% 
unless the covered population is prepared to contribute more than 15%.  This sustained 
high rate of return is considered unrealistic if the past experience of NSSF returns is 
taken as an example of the probable performance of the new scheme.  Hence, it will be 
likely that ex post replacement rate will be much lower than what targeted making the 
provident fund reform option undesirable from the point of view of benefit adequacy.  In 
our simulations, the use of a 3% real return reduces end of period expected replacement 
rates for civil servants and teachers to 27% and 21%, respectively. 
Though in relative terms a 50% replacement rate appears to be adequate, it implies rather 
low benefits in absolute terms (money value) as wages in the public sector are very low 
compared to the economy wide average.  This indicates that the reform of the PSPF 
should be accompanied by a reform of the civil service.  The lack of progress in the 
comprehensive reform of the civil servant remuneration and hiring policy, together with 
the serious governance problems experienced by the NSSF in the past make a pure DC 
reform of the PSPF impractical.  All this strongly suggests the following two policy 
recommendations:  
1)  a reform of the civil servant salary structure needs considering at the same time as 
the reform of the PSPF so that pay and pensions are considered integral, rather 
than separate, elements of compensation; and  
2)  a pure DC reform, irrespective of the switching patterns, should not be considered 
by the Ugandan authorities due to the inadequate retirement benefits that it is 
likely to produce. 
The hybrid or two-pillar reform option mitigates some of the undesirable properties of the 
provident fund option.  The hybrid reform has the same impact in reducing government 
expenditure for given grandfathering rules.  The reason for this is due to the fact that 
when the first pillar is in surplus, the only source of expenditure is represented by: 1) An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 17 -   
wages; 2) the 10% contribution rate for the government to the new scheme; and 3) the 
pension expenditure for the grandfathered workers under the old scheme.  Wages and the 
10% contribution rate are identical under both reform options.  Hence, pension 
expenditure is only determined by the grandfathering rules that policymakers will adopt.  
Immediate switching with price indexation of benefits to new retirees has the strongest 
impact in reducing pension expenditure.  Allowing only new entrants to join the new 
scheme will have the weakest impact in reducing government expenditure. 
The hybrid reform will provide higher expected replacement rates than the pure provident 
fund option due to the redistributive and pooling (insurance) properties of the small 
defined benefit first pillar. 
In addition, the hybrid reform provides additional benefits.  It provides a minimum 
annuity benefit, hence longevity insurance, in an environment not likely to be able to 
safely support privately managed annuities for the foreseeable future.  It facilitates the 
introduction of sort of a minimum pension over the long run due to the effect of price 
indexation of the ceiling on contributions to the defined benefit component.  It has better 
risk sharing properties when compared with the pure provident fund reform option as it 
maintains a modest intergenerational risk sharing dimension. 
The hybrid reform also entails risks.  The presence of a DB component leaves the door 
open for manipulation of DB parameters: especially of the benefit indexation, 
contribution ceiling indexation and defined benefit formula parameters.  This risk should 
be mitigated by increasing the preparation and influence of MPS staff in analyzing the 
impact of pension variables and requiring their technical input in amending laws and 
regulations affecting the scheme.  In addition, and similarly to the pure provident fund 
option, it entails the risk that poor governance of asset management will produce 
unsatisfactory average rates of return.  This second risk is partly mitigated by the 
presence of a DB scheme. 
All this suggests the following four policy recommendations: 
A.  A hybrid type of reform is more likely to provide adequate replacement rates than 
a pure DC reform as it provides a minimum longevity insurance that the private 
sector is likely not to be able to provide until the financial sector has reached a 
very different stage of development.  The complementary DC component would 
grow at a lower rate giving time for financial sector development policies to be 
implemented. 
B.  The presence of a DB component leaves the door open for manipulation of DB 
parameters.  This risk should be mitigated by increasing the preparation and 
influence of MPS staff in analyzing the impact of pension variables and requiring 
their technical input in amending laws and regulations affecting the scheme. 
C.  A contribution wage ceiling, indexed to prices, should be introduced to gradually 
reduce contributions to the DB component in line with ageing of the covered 
population and the development of the financial market.  Ultimately, the effect of 
this policy would be to introduce a minimum pension for civil servants. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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D.  Careful modeling will be needed to select those grandfathering rules that 
adequately trade-off the need to reduce government expenditure with the need to 
create political consensus in support of the reform. 
In addition, critical preconditions for successfully reforming the scheme in any of the 
directions considered include the successful computerization and integration of the 
payroll systems of civil servants and teachers, the implementation of the pay reform 
strategy of 2001, strengthening of MPS capacity in modeling pension reform options and 
forecasting pension expenditure, and strengthening the governance standards of public 
pension fund management. 
 An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses the results of simulations conducted to project future Government 
liabilities stemming from the provision of the Pensions Act (CAP 286).  It also discusses 
options for reforming the Public Service Pension Fund (PSPF).  The projections were 
generated with the World Bank Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit (PROST) 
model, version 12. 
The results presented in this paper are based mainly on data obtained between December 
2004 and April 2005 from the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 
(MOFPED), the Ministry of Public Service (MPS), and the Kampala City Council 
(KCC).  Other sources of data and assumptions needed for the projections are listed in the 
reference section at the end of this paper.  All assumptions used in the simulations were 
discussed and agreed upon with MPS officials. 
The analysis conducted addresses one of the four reform priorities of the Government of 
Uganda, detailed in a draft cabinet paper.  Such draft includes the strategy for reforming 
the pension system in the country as one of the priorities.  At the time of writing, the 
document was supposed to be submitted to cabinet by the end of fiscal year 2004/05 for 
discussion.  The paper builds on Deloitte and Touche (2001) and improves it in the 
following way: 1) it presents the demographic, macroeconomic, and recruitment policy 
assumptions used in the projections to facilitate replication of results; 2) it updates the 
assumptions needed for the projections by using the latest policy documents such as MPS 
(2001, 2003 and 2005) and GOU (2005); 3) it expands the analysis to also include civil 
servants outside the central government; and 4) it separates survivors from old age 
retirees. 
The paper is structured in the following way: section I provides a snapshot of the 
Ugandan pension system and summary information on the reform agenda pending with 
the Government; section II provides a detailed description of PSPF scheme and the legal 
provision contained in CAP 286; section III reports quantitative information on the 
different populations covered by the scheme based on the data collected for our 
simulations; section IV presents what is commonly referred to as “the baseline” 
projections: i.e., long run projections of key variables for the scheme if it is not reformed; 
and section V presents alternative reform options, including options suggested by 
officials in the Ministry of Public Service.  Conclusions follow in the last section. 
The analysis is technical in nature but targets both technical and non-technical audiences.  
APPENDIX A explains in detail the projection/simulation methodology and key 
assumptions used in our exercise.  This can be safely skipped by readers who do not wish 
to, or are already familiar with, the modeling methodology used for the projections.  All 
important results derived in sections IV and V are summarized in the last section where 
policy conclusions are drawn. 
APPENDIX E provides an in-depth analysis of the adequacy of pension benefits under 
the proposed reform scenarios by looking at the potential impact of reforms on different 
types of individuals representative of four different sub-groups of the civil servant 
population and selected in consultation with officials in MPS.  The four representative 
types are: 1) teacher or policeman; 2) head teacher; 3) commissioner; and 4) Permanent Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Secretary.  The appendix, together with the results contained in the main body of the 
paper related to only the “average” civil servant, allow for a better appreciation of the 
impact on pension benefits that the alternative reform options discussed in the text are 
likely to have for ten different types (distinguished also by gender) of civil servants. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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I THE UGANDAN PENSION SYSTEM AND THE REFORM 
AGENDA 
Uganda has a pension system similar to most Anglo-speaking countries in Africa: it 
covers a small proportion
1 of the labor force and it has accumulated assets of only about 
0.6% of GDP. 
Private sector workers in companies with more than five employees are covered by the 
National Social Security Fund (NSSF) which was established in 1985.  Public sector 
workers are covered by two schemes.  Central government officers, local authority 
officers (including teachers) and disciplined forces (police and prisons) are covered by 
the PSPF which was established on January 1
st, 1946.  Armed Forces personnel are 
covered by the Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS), established on September 3
rd, 
1939.  Few voluntary occupational schemes are active but they are not regulated.  There 
is no pension supervisor in Uganda.   
The following table summarizes the basic characteristics of the schemes just mentioned. 
Table 3: The Uganda pension system 
  PSPF  PSPF /1  AFPS  NSSF  OPS 
Legal 
framework 
Pensions Act (CAP 
286) /4  
Pensions Act 
(CAP 286)  
Armed Forces 
Pensions Act 
(CAP 298)  
National Social 
Security Act 













































































lump sums  Lump sums  Annuities and 
lump sums 
Notes: /1 Urban authorities, until 1994, had their own provident funds established under the provisions of the 
Municipalities and Public Authorities Provident Fund (CAP 291).  After the 1994 amendment of the Pensions Act, all 
urban authorities were required to provide pensions to their workers under the Pensions Act CAP 286.  /2 Voluntary 
arrangements take the form of trust deeds/plans.  /3 The funding status of voluntary occupational schemes is not clearly 
ascertained as these schemes are currently not regulated and supervised; /4 The number of the pension act was changed 
in 2006 from 281 to 286. 
                                                 
1 The STG (2003) paper indicates that over 95% of the population in Uganda is excluded from the current 
formal social protection coverage. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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The pension system in Uganda is afflicted by a long series of problems.  Serious issues of 
governance and mismanagement affect NSSF.  PSPF and AFPS are very generous 
schemes crowding out precious resources in the budget.  Voluntary schemes are 
unregulated.  The overall regulatory framework is weak and there is no agency in place to 
supervise the pension system.   
While the pension policy debate is being extended to include a large number of 
stakeholders, it is effectively limited to only a few individuals due to the weak capacity in 
many institutions/agencies to understand pension policy issues.  Nevertheless, the process 
strives at achieving high transparency, and extensive consultation with various 
stakeholders.   
Finally, due to budget limitations of the central and local governments and ad hoc 
revisions of benefit formulas that underestimated the impact on future liabilities, the 
Uganda government has accumulated substantial arrears in the area of pensions that are 
estimated in the neighborhood of US$ 150 to 200 million.  These liabilities are mostly in 
UGS but around US$ 24 million are also due in foreign currency.  The following table 
reports outstanding claims grouped in the two currencies and in 8 major categories. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Table 4: Government pension arrears 
Cat.  Estimated 
Amount  Description 
Foreign currency liabilities 
A US$  12 
mln. 
Since 1977 pensions to various categories of workers of the East 
African Community have not been paid.  As of 2001 these have been paid 
but only pensions related to employees of the East African Airways are 
currently being paid.  The due amount was estimated in June 2006at 
US$12 million earning a 7% annual interest. 
 
B US$  2.3 
mln. 
Residual category of East African Community pensions earning 7% 
interest annually.  Totally paid as of June 2006. 
 
 US$  12 
mln. 
Total estimate US$ arrears as of June 2006. 
Local currency liabilities 
C UGS  19 
bln. 
Gratuities to contractual workers, political leaders and commuted 
pensions.  There are some 1,200 people in this category 
 
D UGS  79 
bln. 
The high inflation since 1987 prompted legislator to amend the Pension 
Act (CAP 286) and introduce wage indexation of pensions in 1995.  This 
applied retroactively to all wage increases since 1988.  UGS 79 bln is 
what is still unpaid of the liability increase created by the 
introduction of wage indexation. 
 
E UGS  107 
bln. 
Pensions to members of disbanded armies. 
 
F UGS  20 
bln. 
Survivors’ pensions of defense personnel 
 
G UGS  17.5 
bln. 
Local government pensions.  Local governments are required to fund 
their pension liabilities through local taxes.  However, in 2001, the 
central government agreed to fund the liabilities accrued up to that 
year.  The agreement excluded liabilities associated to wage 
indexation of pensions.  The financial situation of local authorities 
has not improved since 2001 and local authorities are accruing 
liabilities as per provisions of CAP 286. 
 
H UGS  20 
bln. 
Gratuities of ISO/ESO (intelligence) personnel. 
 
 UGS  142 
bln. 
Total estimate UGS arrears as of June 2006 using exchange rate as of 
06/30/2006 of 1 US$ = UG$ 1,841. 
Source: discussions with MPS officials. 
The arrears listed above do not affect our projections.  This is because the commuted 
pension is not paid to new retirees (category C), and the reduced pension, to both new 
(flow) and old (stock) of retirees, is paid in full.  However, the arrears certainly need to 
be considered as part of the implicit pension debt calculated in the next sections, in order 
to estimate the total pension liabilities (implicit and explicit) that the government has 
accumulated. 
The reform of the pension system, in general, has been pending with the government for 
a long time.  During this period the Ugandan authorities have benefited from the advice 
of various parties.  The content of large numbers of reports written so far on this matter is 
summarized in Callund (2004).  A draft cabinet paper was submitted to cabinet at the end 
of the fiscal year 2004/05 detailing general principles for reforming the pension system.  
Four main issues were covered in the paper: 1) design of adequate regulatory and 
supervisory framework for all retirement benefit schemes; 2) liberalization of the pension 
system aimed at promoting choice among covered population and participation of private Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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sector service providers; 3) reform of PSPF to reduce the fiscal pressure on the budget; 
and 4) reform of NSSF to improve governance and asset management, as well as reduce 
its monopoly in the management of mandatory contributions.  At present, the document 
has yet to be discussed in the Cabinet.   
Nevertheless, the Cabinet approved to reform the PSPF scheme from non-contributory to 
contributory.  It is within this framework that this paper provides an analysis of options 
for reforming the scheme while transforming it into a contributory scheme. 
The following section provides a more detailed description of the benefit and entitlement 
provisions contained in CAP 286. 
II T HE PUBLIC SERVICE PENSION SCHEME 
II.A Coverage 
CAP 286 regulates the pension arrangements for traditional civil servants, civil servants 
in local authorities (districts, municipalities, town councils) and primary and secondary 
school teachers.  Traditional civil servants include public employees in the central 
government, police officers, prison officers, doctors and public employees in the 
judiciary branch.  In this paper we model pension liabilities for two sets of populations.  
On the one hand, we group primary and secondary school teachers.  On the other hand, 
we group all other public civil servants covered by CAP 286.  The former group is 
referred to in what follows as “Teachers” while the latter group is referred to as “Civil 
Servants”. 
The MPS is responsible for administering benefit payments to individuals covered by 
CAP 286.
2  It is also responsible for record keeping of personnel data for active 
employers among traditional civil servants and teachers. 
II.B Old  age  pension 
CAP 286 provides for several pension benefits in the form of lump sums (called in 
Uganda “gratuities”) or annuities.   
Old age pension can be obtained in the form of annuity only (called in Uganda “full 
pension”) or as a combination of lump sum (called in Uganda “commuted pension 
gratuity”) and a reduced annuity (called in Uganda “reduced pension”)
3.  Old age pension 
can be obtained on completion of twenty years of continuous service in a pensionable 
appointment or on the attainment of the age of forty five years and on completion of ten 
years of continuous service in a pensionable appointment.  The full pension is based on 
final gross salary with an accrual
4 factor of 2.4% multiplied by the number of years in 
                                                 
2 MPS also administers benefits for Armed Forces personnel as provided for by CAP 298.  However, it 
does not administer the scheme. 
3 The term “reduced pension” does not imply that a benefit lower than what is due is paid.  Indeed, the 
government of Uganda is still paying pension arrears as explained in section I and budget limitations do not 
allow MPS to fully pay commuted pension gratuities and other gratuities.  Nevertheless, reduced pensions 
are paid in full.  This observation will become important when we use actual data pension expenditure from 
the base year to project pension liabilities in sections IV and V. 
4 This is commonly known in Uganda as the fraction of 1/500. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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service and capped at 87% of final gross salary.  Compulsory retirement age is at 60 for 
both men and women. 
The commuted pension gratuity (CPG) is an advance payment of old age pension to 
newly retirees.  It is the equivalent to 1/3 of full pension that a new retiree would obtain 
in the following 15 years after retirement assuming no indexation is applied.   
The reduced pension is the monthly pension that the new retiree obtains when it opts for 
the CPG.  The reduced pension is restored to the full pension after 15 years.   
Both the full pension and the reduced pensions are indexed to wages.  However, the way 
indexation is computed for the reduced pension implies that reduced pensions grow more 
quickly than wages during the 15 years before restoration to full pension.
5 
Beyond the basic entitlement rules described before, CAP 286 also provides for the 
following old age pension entitlement rules: 
•  On abolition of office 
•  On compulsory retirement for the purpose of facilitating improvement in the 
organization of the department to which the officer belongs, by which greater 
efficiency or economy may be affected. 
•  On medical grounds, to the satisfaction of the Pensions Authority, that an officer 
is incapable by reason or any infirmity of mind or body of discharging duties of 
his/her office and that such infirmity is likely to be permanent. 
•  When one retires from the Public Service with the written consent of the President 
acting on the advice of the Public/Judicial/Education Service Commission, as the 
case may be. 
•  Where an officer is removed from the Public Service in the public interest, 
irrespective of the age of the officer at the date of removal, provided the officer 
had completed 10 years’ service on permanent and pensionable terms. 
•  For a women officer who resigns on, or retires with a view to marriage or is 
required to retire on account of her marriage if she has served for a continuous 
period of five years. 
•  In the case of Police and Prisons officers below the ranks of Assistant Inspector 
and Principal Officer respectively, they must have served for at least 12 years.   
•  A member of the Police Force shall retire on attainment of 55 years of age or, 
they may retire regardless of age on successful completion of 20 years continuous 
service. 
II.C Survivors’  pensions 
Pension to survivors (orphans, widows and widowers) is equivalent to 100% of the 
pension entitlement of the deceased public officers.  This could be 100% of the full 
pension for qualifying deceased public officers in active duty or 100% of the full or 
reduced pension (whatever elected) for the retirees deceased in the first 15 years of 
                                                 
5 See later the details on indexation of reduced pensions and how this was modeled in our simulations. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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retirement.  Survivors’ pensions are paid only up to 15 years.  This means that a survivor 
of a deceased public officer in active service will obtain a pension for 15 years.  
However, a survivor of a deceased retired public officer during the first 15 years of 
retirement will only obtain a survivor pension for the remainder of such 15 years. 
II.D Other  gratuities 
Beyond the CPG described before, CAP 286 provides for a long series of other gratuities. 
•  Contract gratuities are awarded for non-pensionable service of public officers 
serving on contract.  These gratuities are contractually determined. 
•  Death gratuities are paid to deceased public officers’ representatives or surviving 
relatives.  The gratuity amounts to three times the salary of deceased person at 
death or the deceased person’s CPG if entitled to it, whichever is higher. 
•  Short term gratuities are awarded to public officers retired on medical grounds or 
when they are dismissed in the interest of the public with at least 10 years of 
pensionable service.  The gratuity is equivalent to 24% of the last annual salary 
multiplied by the number of years in service. 
•  Marriage gratuities are awarded to women public officers retiring on marriage 
grounds.  The marriage gratuity is equivalent to 12% of the last salary multiplied 
by the number of years in service. 
•  Gratuities for Police officers are awarded when officers retire with a rank below 
the rank of assistant inspector with at least 13 years of pensionable service.  
Gratuities for Prison officers are awarded when officers retire with a rank below 
the rank of principal officer with at least 13 years of pensionable service.  The 
gratuity for police and prisons officers is capped at 25% of total emoluments. 
The following table provides a summary of benefits and entitlement provisions contained 
in CAP 286. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Table 5: Benefit Types under CAP 286 
Type of Benefit  Requirement/s  Formula 
(a) Old age pensions    
Full monthly pension  
(if no CPG)  
Length of service 20 years, 
or 45 years of age and 10 
years of service.  Mandatory 
retirement age: 60 
((1/500th of the annual 
salary before retirement * 
total number of months of 
service) /12 
Commuted Pension  
Gratuity (CPG)  
Length of service 20 years, 
or 45 years of age and 10 
years of service.  Mandatory 
retirement age: 60 
(1/500th of the annual 
salary before retirement * 
total number of months of 
service) *(1/3) *15 
Reduced Monthly Pension  
(if CPG)  
Length of service 20 years, 
or 45 years of age and 10 
years of service.  Mandatory 
retirement age: 60 
(1/500th of the annual 
salary before retirement * 
total number of months of 
service) *(2/3) /12 
    
(b) Survivors' Benefits  Paid to spouse and children 
when pensioner/active member 
dies before the expiry of 
fifteen years after the date 
of his/her retirement (for 
full 15 years in case of 
active member 
Pensioner/active member 
monthly pension paid for up 
to 15 years 
    
(c) Pension on abolition of 
office 
Abolition of office 
Normal pension + 25 % of the 
pension + severance pay + 
repatriation expenses +  6 
months pay in lieu of notice 
+  payment in lieu of 
approved earned leave 
    
(d) Contract  Gratuity for 
Public Officers serving on 
contract  Contract agreement 
Gratuity computed according 
to the terms of the contract 
agreement.  Usually a 
prescribed percentage of the 
annual gross salary 
    
(e) Death Gratuity 
Representative of a deceased 
public officer 
Deceased public officers' 
annual salary at the time of 
death by three, or the 
deceased officer's would-
have-been CPG, which ever is 
greater 
    
(f) Short Service Gratuity  Public officers retired in 
the public interest or on 
medical grounds provided 
they had completed 10 years 
of pensionable service 
(1/500th of the annual 
salary before retirement * 
total number of months of 
service) *10 
    
(g) Marriage Gratuity  Payable to women public 
officers who retire on 
marriage grounds 
(Total number of months * 
annual salary) *5/ 500 
    
(h) Gratuity for Police and 
Prisons officers 
Police office who retires 
below the rank of assistant 
inspector, or in case the 
prisons service below the 
rank of principal officer 
and has served for 12 years, 
or more 
25 % of total emoluments or 
less 
Source: CAP 286. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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III INFORMATION ON COVERED POPULATIONS 
III.A Data availability 
We have decided to divide (and simulate separately) teachers from other covered 
populations (central government civil servants, judiciary, doctors, local authority civil 
servants, prisons and police).  Their different characteristics such as wages, age 
composition of the covered population, system dependency ratio, etcetera, play an 
important role in modeling.  Consequently, two sets of data, one for teachers and one for 
civil servants, were collected as described below. 
Pensioner data was provided by MPS, active member data was provided by MPS and 
MOFPED.  Individual records of selected fields (age, gender, income, length of service) 
were provided for both active employees and beneficiaries, among traditional civil 
servants, local authorities and teachers.  The following, is a complete list of data received 
directly and derived from the provided database for the base year of 2003/04: 
a)  Total number, as well as age (by single year age groups) and gender composition 
of public servants.  Initially, these data included contractors and other non-
pensionable categories of workers.  Therefore, an additional dataset of individual 
records was provided.  This allowed us to separate employees who are under 
pensionable and non-pensionable categories.  As this dataset contained serious 
deficiencies (particularly on birth dates), several approximations were used.  For 
instance, we ignored information on active employees younger than 14 years old.  
According to the dataset, only less than 3 percent of all active employees are non-
pensionable: i.e., they do not accrue pension rights. 
b)  Wage distribution of active members by income brackets and gender.  These data 
also included contractors and other non-pensionable categories of workers and 
had to be adjusted accordingly. 
c)  Age and gender distribution of wages (average wage for each single year age and 
gender group).  As for a) and b) above, the dataset of individual records had to be 
adjusted to separate the non-pensionable from the pensionable categories of civil 
servants. 
d)  Age and gender distribution of new active members, recruited in 2003-2004. 
e)  Total number as well as age (by single year age groups) and gender composition 
for the stock of pensioners.  The complete pensioner individual database was only 
available for all pensioners – old-age pensioners and survivors – together and did 
not contain fields indicating the beneficiary category.  In addition, a 
representative sample of pensioner individual records (8,609 records) containing 
beneficiary category indicators was provided, though these data were not 
segregated by gender.  The sample was used as a basis for separating survivors 
from old-age pensioners in the total beneficiary population. 
f)  Income distribution for the stock of pensioners.  These data were also lumped 
together for all beneficiary categories, however – since survivors receive 100% of 
old age pensions of the deceased individuals – it was assumed that this 
distribution applies also to the stock of old age pensioners. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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g)  Age and gender distribution of pensions (average pension for each single year age 
and gender group) for the stock of pensioners.  Same as in f), this distribution was 
used for the stock of old age pensioners. 
h)  Flow of pensioners by age and gender retired in 2003/2004. 
i)  Length of service at retirement by single age and gender. 
No data was available on the value of benefits due and actually paid, including a break 
down by categories of benefits.  Estimates for the value of benefits relevant for our 
simulations (a) and (b) in Table 5 and actually due were derived from individual data.  
Estimates for the value of benefits (c) to (h)
6 in Table 5 and actually due were provided 
by MPS.  For civil servants and teachers the share of “other expenses” in the total was 
estimated to be about 15% and 8%, respectively. 
The following section summarizes the data available for projections. 
III.B Information on the stock of active employees 
Table 6 reports summary data on the stock of civil servants and teachers for the base year 
of 2003/04.  Civil servants amounted to a total of 69,704 individuals with an average age 
of 39 and an average annual wage of UGS 2,817 thousands.  Male civil servants 
amounted to 50,212 individuals with an average age of 40 and an average annual wage of 
UGS 2,862 thousands.  Female employees are fewer (less than 30%) and tend to be 
slightly younger, therefore earning a lower average wage than male employees despite 
very similar age distribution of wages. 
The total number of teachers holding pensionable positions is 141,432, with an average 
age of 35 and an average annual wage of UGS 2,068 thousands.  Like civil servants, 
female teachers are on average younger than their male counterparts and receive lower 
wages.  It is interesting to note that in Uganda male teachers represent 67% of the 
teaching population while in most countries the gender distribution is generally reversed.   
Table 6: Summary of data on the stock of employees, 2003/04 
  2003/04  Civil servant employees  Teacher employees 
Men  50.212 94.211 












Total  69.704 141.432 
Men  39.66 36.03 










Total  39.14 35.03 
Men  2,862.3 2,176.3 


















Total  2,817.4 2,067.9 
Source: MOFPED. 
Figure 1 reports the age distribution of the 69,704 civil servants as of 2003/04 while the 
age distribution of the 141,432 teachers is presented in Figure 2. 
                                                 
6 Categories (c) to (h) were modeled and will be referred to as “other expenses”. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 1: More than 50% of civil servants are men between the ages of 







































Notes: * Age distribution of civil servants (2003/2004) 
Source: MOFPED 
Figure 2: More than 30% of all teachers are women between the ages of 







































Notes: * Age distribution of teachers (2003/04). 
Source: MOFPED.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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The age distribution of teachers is more skewed to the left hand side than the age 
distribution for civil servants for both genders telling us that on average teachers are 
younger than civil servants.  The average age of teachers is 35 years (36 men and 33 
women) while the average age for civil servants is 39 years (40 men and 38 women). 
The age distributions of wages (Figure 3) for men and women in each of the two sub-
schemes are very similar.  However, on average civil servants tend to have higher wages 
than teachers in the same age and gender group.  For modeling purposes the distributions 
were smoothed and assumed to be the same for both genders. 
Figure 3: On average civil servants wages increase with age for both men 

























Notes: * Age and wage distribution for civil servants (2003/04). 
Source: MOFPED.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 4: On average teacher wages slightly increase with age for both 

























Notes: * Age and wage distribution for teachers (2003/04). 
Source: MOFPED. 
III.C  Information on the stock of retirees 
The total number of beneficiaries in all categories is 15,813 and 11,567 for civil servants 
and teachers respectively.  As previously mentioned, the individual records of the stock 
of beneficiaries did not specify who old-age pensioners were or who survivors were.  An 
additional sample was used to separate pensioners by benefit category.  The sample data 
were not segregated by gender and the age indicated in the records related to recipients of 
survivorship benefit referred to the age of the deceased employee/old age pensioner (not 
the survivor her/himself).  All pensioners 45 years of age were assumed to be survivors.  
For pensioners older than 45 years, the share of survivors in each age cohort – derived 
from the sample – was assumed to be the same for men and women.   
The number of survivors was estimated to be 2,292 among civil servants and 505 among 
teachers.  Table 7 summarizes the estimated numbers of the stock of old age pensioners, 
their average age and pension for the base year of 2003/04.  The number of active 
teachers is twice as large as the number of civil servants.  However, the number of 
teacher retirees is somewhat smaller.  This is due to the fact that the teachers sub-scheme 
is significantly younger following a recently introduced expansion in hiring policy.  
Teacher retirees are also on average slightly older than government retirees, and receive 
lower pensions due to their lower average wages. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Table 7: Summary of data on the stock of old age pensioners (2003/04)  
  2003/04  Civil Servant retirees  Teacher retirees 
Men  12.155 8.297 












Total  13.521 11.062 
Men  64.5 70.1 










Total  64.3 69.6 
Men  2,301.7 1,945.3 






















Total  2,248.5 1,758.6 
Notes: /1 this includes only annuities from reduced and full pensions. 
Source: MPS. 
Age distributions for the stock of old age pensioners derived for the base year of 2003/04 
are plotted in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
Figure 5: Almost 90% of government retirees are men between the ages 








































Notes: * Age distribution of civil servant retirees (2003/04). 
Source: MPS. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Notes: * Age distribution of teacher retirees (2003/04). 
Source: MPS. 
The gender distribution of both government and teacher retirees is more skewed than the 
gender distribution of respective active workers.  The gender ratio is 2.6 men for every 
woman for active civil servants and 2 for teachers.  The same ratios are 9 and 3 for 
government retirees and teachers, respectively.  The skewed gender distribution is easily 
explained by the fact that, generally women do not accrue pensionable rights as they exit 
the labor market early for various reasons including marriage and household care.  In 
Uganda, the marriage gratuity provided under CAP 286 contributes to explaining this 
gender skewness as, ceteris paribus, it promotes marriages.  To some extent, this may 
also stem from growing labor force participation rates for women which is also widely 
observed in many developing countries. 
Figure 7 shows the age and gender distributions of old age pensions for the stock of 
retirees derived from the database for the base year of 2003/2004. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 7: Age and gender distribution of the stock of civil servant 



























































Figure 8: Age and gender distribution of the stock of teacher retirees 


























































Source: MPS. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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III.D Estimated key indicators for 2003/2004 
Table 8 reports the main pension indicators estimated for the base year 2003/2004.  The 
indicators are derived from the data provided by our Ugandan counterparts.  The total 
expenditure is calculated as what was due to system participants during the base year, 
without considering past arrears.
7 
Table 8: Main pension system indicators (2003/04)  
Indicators  Civil Servants  Teachers 
System dependency ratio*  29.1% 8.2% 
Estimated total expenditure** 





Of which:    
























Total expenditure as % of GDP  0.59% 0.40% 
Average replacement rates for old-
age pensioners: 







Memo items:    
GDP UGS 12,121,000 mln     
Population 23,443,052     
*Number of all beneficiaries / Number of active employees 
**Due to be paid in 2003/2004, excluding past arrears 
***MPS experts’ estimates 
****Average covered wage = average wage received by active employees in the respective covered population groups 
(government or teachers) 
IV THE BASELINE PROJECTIONS 
The analysis of the long term sustainability of a pension system involves assessing the 
adequacy of the pension promise defined in legal provisions and the cost associated with 
these pension promises.  As far as adequacy of benefits is concerned, replacement rates in 
terms of average wage provide a useful measure of what individuals may expect to 
receive when they retire.  As far as system costs are concerned, key benchmarks would 
be the time path of system expenditure, the contribution rate required to balance the 
system if the system were contributory, the financing gap (as an overall measure of 
system future liabilities), and the implicit pension debt (liabilities accrued by the system 
at a given point in time). 
Apart from the generosity of benefits, the cost of the system is largely driven by the 
system demographics summarized in the system dependency rate. 
                                                 
7 We have previously mentioned, but it is worth repeating it, that pension arrears do not affect our 
projections as the totality of new retirees elects to receive the reduced pension which is paid in full. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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IV.A Projected system dependency rate 
The system dependency rate – a ratio of the total number of beneficiaries to the total 
number of active members – is largely determined by assumptions on coverage, 
retirement rates and mortality rates outlined in APPENDIX A.  We argue that the use of 
country population mortality assumptions for civil servants may not be appropriate given 
the fact that in many countries, civil servants live on average longer than the general 
population.  However, we could not confirm this with Ugandan demographers due to the 
lack of population specific mortality tables in the country.  In order to allow for such 
assumption of higher longevity among civil servants, we constructed two baseline 
scenarios and called them “variant 1” and “variant 2”.  Essentially, “variant 2” makes 
allowance for longer life expectancy of civil servant populations while “variant 1” uses 
the population mortality table.   
Figure 9 compares the system dependency rates projected using general population civil 
servant mortality assumptions.  In “variant 2”, longer life expectancy for system 
participants in retirement causes an increase in dependency ratios by increasing the 
number of beneficiaries in each year. 
Figure 9: Projections of civil servant dependency rates* under two 

























variant 1 var iant  2
 
Notes: * Ratio of the total number of beneficiaries in all categories to the total number of active 
employees. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 10: Projections of teacher dependency rates* under two 


























variant 1 var iant  2
 
Notes: * Ratio of the total number of beneficiaries in all categories to the total number of active 
employees. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
The current dependency rate for teachers is 8% and much lower than the 23% rate for 
civil servants.  This stems from the fact that the teachers’ sub-scheme is a much younger 
scheme.  In the future, three main periods can be clearly distinguished: 
•  2004-2014 – very low growth rates in the number of employed under the Pay 
Reform Policy proposal; 
•  2015-2050 – period of faster coverage expansion to reach 1% of population in 
each of the two sub-schemes; 
•  2050-2075 – period of slowing down coverage growth to match general 
population growth rates. 
During the first period the dependency rates in both sub-schemes increase as the growth 
of the number of active members is too slow (especially for civil servants) to offset the 
impact of ageing.   
During the second period of accelerated growth the dependency rate decreases for civil 
servants and stabilizes for teachers.  The difference between the two sub-schemes can be 
explained by the fact that the number of teachers is higher than the number of active civil 
servants and therefore, teachers require a lower rate of growth to reach the target 1% of An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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general population.
8 In addition, the younger sub-scheme for teachers ages more quickly 
than the more mature sub-scheme for civil servants. 
Finally, the third period reverses to growing dependency ratios in both groups as 
coverage expansion substantially slows down.   
Towards the end of the simulation period the dependency rates for civil servants reach 
35% and 38% while for teachers they reach 41% and 45%, under the two mortality 
assumption variants.  If the simulation horizon were extended further, the system 
dependency rates would continue growing as cohorts joined the system during the period 
of accelerated growth retire in full. 
IV.B Projected benefits 
The eligibility conditions and benefits offered by the system are quite generous by 
international standards
9: people can retire early, starting from age 45; the vesting period 
is only 10 years; the annual accrual rate for a full pension is 2.4%, and the individual’s 
last wage (which is normally the highest wage) is used as a reference wage for benefit 
calculation (see Table 5 for details).  For example, a full career male government 
employee retiring at age 60 with an average 35 years of service can expect a full pension 
of about 130% of the average group wage.  Even under the assumption that everybody 
chooses a reduced pension (2/3 of full pension) and the CPG, the average pension for the 
stock of retirees remains quite high relative to the average group wage – at about 80% for 
civil servants and even above 80% for teachers.
10   
When looking at civil service pension schemes in middle and low income countries, the 
average annual accrual rate for a full pension is also around 2.4%, particularly in East and 
South Asia, and most countries in North Africa and the Middle East.  However, when 
looking at other African countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ivory Coast, 
Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo, the accrual rate is 
certainly lower than 2.4%,  being in most cases 2% or less than 2%.  In fact, the only 
African country that might have a more generous civil service pension scheme than 
Uganda might be Cape Verde (Palacios, Whitehouse 2006). 
The projected replacement rates for the stock of retirees are shown in Figure 11.  These 
are relatively stable over time due to wage indexation.  Notice that the replacement rates 
shown in Figure 11 are based only on the reduced
11 pension since we assume everybody 
elects to receive the CPG at the time of retirement and a reduced pension as a regular 
payment.  The CPG is modeled separately as a lump sum that old age pensioners receive 
at the moment of retirement.   
                                                 
8 These rates are 3.2% and 5.7% for teachers and civil servants, respectively until 2050.   
9 See next paragraph, and  Palacios, and Whitehouse, 2006. 
10 In each case the replacement rate is expressed in terms of the average wage for this particular group.  
Though replacement rates for teachers are normally higher, their pensions in money terms are on average 
lower than those of civil servants due to teachers’ lower average wages. 
11 Restoration to full pension after 15 years in retirement is also modeled and taken into account in the 
projected replacement rates. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 11: Projected average replacement rates* for the stock of retirees 
































Notes: Average pension as % of the group average wage.  These replacement rates relate to reduced 
pension only.  If CPG is included, replacement rates are higher than full pension replacement rates due 
to the fact that CPG calculations are more than actuarially fair.  A 40 year career individual would 
retire with almost 100% of his/her final salary as full pension.  Total replacement rates based on 
average salary exceed 100%. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
IV.C Projected system expenditure 
For the projections, pension expenditure is estimated on the basis of the provisions 
contained in CAP 286, irrespectively of potential delays in payment due to administrative 
or budgetary issues.
12   The projected pension expenditure in the future (under the 
assumption of no reform) is illustrated in Figure 12. 
Under the assumption that life expectancy for the covered group is not different from the 
general population (variant 1 of the baseline scenario), total pension expenditure
13 for 
both sub-schemes is expected to increase from the current 1% of GDP to 1.9% around the 
year 2050, and further to 4.5% by the end of the simulation period.  The steady growth of 
system pension expenditure relative to GDP is driven by several factors including 
assumed coverage expansion, wages growing more quickly than GDP per capita, and 
growing dependency rates. 
If mortality rates for civil servant retirees are substantially lower (variant 2), clearly 
pension expenditure increases more quickly as the number of old age pensioners 
receiving benefits in each year increases.  Under variant 2, the total system expenditure is 
projected to grow to 2.1% by 2050 and further 4.8% by 2075. 
                                                 
12 Again, ignoring arrears does not have an impact on our projections.  These are based on the reduced 
pension in the base year that is fully paid. 
13 Including pensions to all beneficiaries, lump-sum payments to all beneficiaries, gratuities, etc. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 12: Projected pension expenditure for civil servants (% of GDP) 






























variant 1 variant 2
 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
Figure 13: Projected pension expenditure for teachers (% of GDP) is 






























variant 1 variant  2
 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Table 9 below provides a break down of the projected expenditure by major cost 
categories for the main baseline variant 1 (assuming general population mortality rates 
apply to the covered population). 
Table 9: Projected total pension expenditure (baseline: variant 1)  
 Year 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2020/21 2050/51 2075/76
(In Million Shs, nominal)
Total pension expenditures 126,026 133,089 149,552 575,191 10,638,752 137,492,853
Teachers
Regular pensions 19,924 22,905 26,791 165,623 3,386,972 43,950,374
of which old age 19,055 21,964 25,754 161,967 3,322,487 43,452,673
survivors 870 941 1,037 3,656 64,485 497,701
Lump-sum payments (CPGs) 25,000 24,443 27,534 103,990 1,730,532 17,963,356
Other expenditures 4,776 5,058 5,761 27,101 509,485 5,881,504
Traditional Civil Servants and Local G.S.
Regular pensions 35,503 39,488 44,051 157,492 2,592,485 40,692,922
of which old age 30,358 34,000 38,237 139,513 2,072,755 36,500,046
survivors 5,145 5,488 5,814 17,979 519,730 4,192,877
Lump-sum payments (CPGs) 25,000 24,429 27,053 63,932 1,225,743 14,986,110
Other expenditures 15,822 16,767 18,362 57,054 1,193,535 14,018,588
GDP 12,121,000 13,529,291 14,870,991 60,443,332 530,418,048 2,962,347,008  
(As % of GDP)
Total pension expenditures 1.04% 0.98% 1.01% 0.95% 2.01% 4.64%
Teachers
Regular pensions 0.16% 0.17% 0.18% 0.27% 0.64% 1.48%
of which old age 0.16% 0.16% 0.17% 0.27% 0.63% 1.47%
survivors 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
Lump-sum payments (CPGs) 0.21% 0.18% 0.19% 0.17% 0.33% 0.61%
Other expenditures 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.10% 0.20%
Traditional Civil Servants and Local G.S.
Regular pensions 0.29% 0.29% 0.30% 0.26% 0.49% 1.37%
of which old age 0.25% 0.25% 0.26% 0.23% 0.39% 1.23%
survivors 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.10% 0.14%
Lump-sum payments (CPGs) 0.21% 0.18% 0.18% 0.11% 0.23% 0.51%
Other expenditures 0.13% 0.12% 0.12% 0.09% 0.23% 0.47%
Source: PROST output files 
IV.D Required contribution rate 
The required contribution rate is an analytical indicator measuring the rate that 
contributors should pay on their covered wages (regardless of whether it is levied against 
the employee or employer – in this case the government) to balance the system, assuming 
the system expenditure is solely financed through contributions.  It can be calculated for 
each year or as a sustainable contribution rate balancing the system over the whole 
simulation period.  This is a useful measure of what the system would cost to contributors 
if it were contributory. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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In a defined benefit system, one of the key factors determining the required contribution 
rate is the system dependency rate so the projected time path for the required contribution 
rate (Figure 14) is consistent with that of the dependency rate (compare with Figure 9). 
Figure 14: Required contribution rate needed to balance the scheme 























variant 1 variant 2
 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 15: Required contribution rate needed to balance the scheme 























variant 1 variant 2
 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
The required contribution rate for the civil servants sub-scheme starts from already a very 
high level of 36% which would not be sustainable even in a developed economy.  Over 
time, it increases, then down and then up again driven by the changes in the system 
dependency rate.  It reaches its lowest level of 17% and 19% respectively, depending on 
the two mortality variants, by the end of the period of accelerated coverage expansion but 
only for few years.  After 2050 the coverage expansion slows down, the dependency rate 
increases and as a result the required contribution rate also increases.  Due to increasing 
system dependency rates over time, the required contribution rate for civil servants would 
be even higher than what is reported in the graph if the simulation period were extended. 
In the teachers sub-scheme, the required contribution rate is initially much lower than for 
civil servants due to a much lower starting dependency rate.  By the end of the simulation 
period the contribution rate required to balance the teachers sub-scheme exceeds the one 
projected for civil servants.  For both civil servants and teachers, future changes in the 
required contribution rates mimic projected changes in the dependency rate.   
An alternative indicator to the required contribution rate is the “sustainable contribution 
rate”.  This is an indicator conceptually very similar to the required contribution rate but 
it is defined as the fixed contribution rate that would balance the system over the whole 
simulation period.  The sustainable contribution rate for civil servants is estimated at 30% 
and 31%, depending on the two mortality variants.  The sustainable contribution rate for 
teachers is estimated at 36% and 39%, depending on the two mortality variants. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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IV.E  Implicit pension debt and financing gap 
In this study the implicit pension debt (IPD) is defined as the accrued-to-date liabilities 
and is calculated for each particular year as the present value of the benefits the pension 
system will have to pay to its current participants (active member and retirees) and their 
survivors on the basis of their pension rights accrued prior to this particular year.  New 
pension rights earned after the year for which the IPD is calculated are not considered so 
this measure shows how much it would cost to discontinue the pension scheme and pay 
out all up to date obligations.
14 
This is a common indicator used by the international community and fiscal affairs experts 
when comparing the maturation and fiscal burden of different pension systems.  It is 
important to note that this indicator is highly sensitive to the discount rate used in the 
calculation.  The real discount rate used in the simulations for PSPF is quite high at 5% 
which gives an estimate for the system IPD on a lower end.  Varying the discount rate 
may be considered in further simulations. 
Figure 16 illustrates the projected implicit pension debt for Uganda for both groups – 
civil servants and teachers – under two sets of assumptions regarding life expectancy for 
the covered population (variants 1 and 2).  For the base year, the total liabilities accrued 
by the system in both components are estimated at 23% and 27% of GDP respectively, 
depending on the variant.  Liabilities are very large
15 and they continue to build up over 
time reaching 100% and 110% of GDP towards the end of the simulation period.
16  The 
population covered by PSPF increases from less than 1% to 2% of total population over 
the same period. 
                                                 
14 The IPD calculated here is an approximation to the projected benefit obligation (PBO) concept used in 
the US literature. 
15 The discount rate used for IPD calculation is 5% real.  This is made to coincide with real rate of return on 
assets expected in the good state of the world in the reformed scheme.  With a lower discount rate liabilities 
would be of course higher.  The generous discount rate and the limited coverage of the scheme (less than 
1% of Ugandan population) clearly indicate how liabilities are high by international standards. 
16 See APPENDIX C for IPD estimates conducted for some other countries. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 16: Projected implicit pension debt* for civil servants (% of GDP) 
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Notes: * liabilities accrued by the system at a given point in time 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
Figure 17: Projected implicit pension* debt for teachers (% of GDP) 








































variant 1 variant  2
 
Notes: * liabilities accrued by the system at a given point in time 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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The financing gap is calculated as the present value of the projected system expenditure 
and measures the outstanding liabilities under the assumption that the system continues 
and all pension rights are taken into account – accrued-to-date as well as pension rights 
expected to be accrued by system participants in the future.  Since the IPD, this measure 
is very sensitive to the assumed discount rate.  As new pension rights are considered as 
well, normally the financing gap is larger than the IPD.  For civil servants it is estimated 
at 53% and 57% of the base year GDP and for teachers at 60% and 65% for the two 
mortality variants, respectively.  With the assumed accelerated coverage expansion 
throughout a substantial portion of the simulation period, these estimates do not capture 
the total payout period for those joining the system during this period and thus understate 
the liabilities.  Also, the assumed relatively high 5% real discount rate places these 
estimates on a lower end of the estimate range. 
IV.F The role of the recruitment assumptions in baseline 
projections 
The assumptions made regarding recruitments of new teachers and civil servants play a 
crucial role in driving many of the results obtained.  Since recruitment assumptions are 
hard to predict over a long period of time, such as the one used for our simulations, it is 
worth discussing in brief the qualitative impact of alternative recruitment assumptions. 
We have assumed that in the long run the populations of civil servants and teachers will 
reach 1% of the total population respectively.  This specific assumption implies very 
favorable dependency rates over the medium to long term therefore, yielding acceptable 
required contribution rates, especially for civil servants.  For instance, Figure 14 shows 
that the system for civil servants can remain unreformed and rebalanced by making it 
contributory with a 17% contribution rate.  Once the 1% of the population target is 
reached and the recruitment policy slowed to match total population growth, the required 
contribution rate would start increasing rapidly underlying the maturity and generosity of 
the scheme. 
It is straightforward to predict the qualitative changes in the results so far derived if we 
assume a lower growth in the covered population.  For instance, we can compare the end 
of simulation period results in the main baseline described earlier in this section and the 
results of an alternative baseline.  This is identical to the main baseline with the exception 
of a lower assumed growth rate in covered population.  For this alternative baseline we 
have assumed the following: 
1)  From 2004/05 until 2014/15 recruitment policy is the same as in variant 1 (see 
Table 19). 
2)  From 2015/16 through the end of the simulation period teachers grow in line with 
the population growth and civil servants continue to grow at a constant 0.26%.
17   
Table 10 compares the end-of simulation period results of the main and alternative 
baseline scenarios.  As one would expect, dependency rates in the alternative baseline are 
higher due to the faster aging of the covered population when fewer young workers enter 
the labor force every year.  As one would expect, the replacement rates are about the 
                                                 
17 As suggested by the medium-term active populations growth assumptions of Table 19. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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same.  The pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP is lower in the alternative 
baseline as fewer workers would accrue pension benefits.  However, due to the fact that 
fewer workers would pay for pension benefits, the required contribution rate would be 
higher in the alternative baseline.  Finally, the implicit pension debt would be much lower 
in the alternative baseline reflecting smaller growth of covered population.   
Table 10: The impact of lower covered population growth rates on end of simulation 
period results. 
Indicator  Government  
employees  Teachers 








Dependency  rate  56% 35% 45% 41% 
Replacement rate (reduced 
pension only)   69% 68% 72% 70% 
Expenditure as % of GDP  0.5%  2.2%  1.5%  2.3% 
Required contribution rate  62%  38%  56%  44% 
Implicit pension debt as % of 
GDP  8% 46%  29%  52% 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST. 
V OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Two reform options have been modeled as part of the study, with some variations within 
each reform scenario.  In the first option the PSPF scheme is transformed into a provident 
fund (a scenario now being considered by the Government).  We will further refer to this 
option as “Reform I”.  The second option entails transforming the PSPF scheme into a 
hybrid scheme with a small defined benefit component and a complementary mandatory 
defined contribution component.  We will further refer to this reform option as “Reform 
II”.  Both reforms substitute wage indexation of benefits with price indexation for 
switchers
18. 
A number of variations for each of each reform scenario have been modeled.  The first 
pair of variations relates to the switching pattern of workers with accrued pension rights: 
we consider the two polar cases of immediate switching of all current workers to the 
reformed scheme and grandfathering of all workers with accrued rights in the unreformed 
scheme.  In addition, in the provident fund reform option (reform I), we consider two 
cases of benefit indexation for non switchers: maintaining wage indexation or changing it 
to prices.  In the case of the hybrid reform option we do not explore price indexation for 
non-switchers.   
Another pair of meaningful variations involves assumptions regarding the interest rate 
earned on individual accounts.  For each reform I and II we model two cases where assets 
are well managed or mismanaged.   
Hence, seven cases will be analyzed in this section and they are labeled as follows: 
                                                 
18 Here and further in the text switchers mean those individuals who switch to the reformed scheme and non 
switchers – those who stay in the unreformed scheme.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Table 11: Alternative scenarios under the pure DC and hybrid reform options 
 
Notice that in the hybrid reform (reform II) we do not model alternative benefit 
indexation for non switchers.  The reason for this relates that non-switchers remain in the 
current unreformed system and are not affected by any reform scenario.  Therefore, the 
impact of changing benefit indexation to non-switchers under reform I is identical to the 
impact under reform II as the basic DB scheme for non switchers is unchanged under the 
two reforms.  In other words, the analysis of reforms I.2 and I.3 makes the same analysis 
in the hybrid reform redundant.  We are of course interested in how replacement rates and 
expenditure are impacted by the hybrid reform.  But the difference in results for reforms I 
and II will stem from new entrants only.  Hence, in the hybrid option we simply model a 
reform scenario with wage indexation of benefits for non-switchers. 
Given the complex nature of the analysis that follows we will re-define the reform 
options in turn as needed to facilitate the reader. 
V.A Transforming PSPF into provident fund (Reform I)  
Realizing the urgent need for reforming the PSPF, the Government is currently 
considering a drastic move to a public fully funded defined contribution scheme 
(provident fund) with an outsourced fund management.  Based on our discussions with 
MPS, three options for this reform scenario were modeled:  
Reform I.1 – everybody switches to the new system;  
Reform I.2 – the new system is open only for new entrants with active members as of 
2007 remaining in the old scheme; non switcher benefits are indexed to wages.   
    Scenarios 
 
  Baseline  Existing DB scheme 
Reform I.1  Pure DC reform with immediate switching.  Price indexation for switchers and 
current retirees.   
Variant I.1.A: high rate of return on assets 
Variant I.1.B: low rate of return on assets 
 
Reform I.2  Pure DC reform for only new entrants with wage indexation for grandfathered 
employees and current retirees.  Price indexation for switchers.  Assumed 


































Reform I.3  Pure DC reform for only new entrants with price indexation for grandfathered 
employees and current retirees.  Price indexation for switchers.  Assumed 
high rate of return on assets. 
 
Reform II.1  Hybrid reform with immediate switching.  Price indexation for switchers and 
current retirees.  Assumed high rate of return on assets. 
Variant II.1.A: high rate of return on assets 






























Reform II.2  Hybrid reform for only new entrants with wage indexation for grandfathered 
employees and current retirees.  Price indexation for switchers.  Assumed 
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Reform I.3 – the new system is open only for new entrants with active members as of 
2007 remaining in the old scheme; non switcher benefits are indexed to prices.   
Reform I.1, on the one hand, and Reforms I.2 and I.3, on the other hand, are two extreme 
cases with respect to how fast the fully funded defined contribution system is introduced 
to estimate the impact of the transition path on the system costs and benefits. 
V.A.1 Reform  I.1 
Reform I.1 scenario was modeled as follows: 
¾  Reform starts in 2007. 
¾  Everybody switches to the new system. 
¾  Pension rights accrued under the old system are fully honored.  The accrued rights 
are calculated based on individual’s wage and years of service at the moment of 
reform and paid out when the person retires.  Price indexation is applied to the 
calculated benefits between the year of reform and the year of retirement.  The 
following rules are applied for accrued rights calculations: (1) with less than 20 
years of service the person obtains a lump sum calculated using the short-service 
gratuity formula; (2) with 20 years and more the person obtains the CPG and a 
reduced pension calculated using the CPG and reduced pension formulae. 
¾  Contribution rate is 15%: 5% paid by employee, 10% by employer.  It is 
calibrated to achieve a target replacement rate of about 60% for the flow of new 
retirees. 
¾  Eligibility criteria related to retirement age remain the same.  However, it is 
assumed that fewer people will retire early as the new scheme strengthens the link 
between benefits and contributions and, consequently, provides incentives to 
work longer.
19 
¾  Benefits from the new system are paid out in the form of scheduled (programmed) 
withdrawals; no lump sum withdrawals are allowed; all types of gratuities offered 
by the old system are abolished.
20   
¾  Administration/asset management fees start with a high 7% of assets to cover the 
start-up costs which then gradually go down to 1% by around 2020.  In a 
practically non-competitive environment, 1% is what major fund management 
companies currently operating in Uganda charge.  In the long run, the fees are 
                                                 
19 Other possible changes in behavior due to changes in incentives should be considered in further 
simulations. 
20 The non-practical suggestion of allowing for life annuities provided by insurance companies was 
discarded given the absence of fixed income assets required to immunize the fixed income liabilities, 
typical of the simplest forms annuity products.  Allowing for annuity products with embedded options (say, 
with return of principal at death or other forms of guarantees) would obviously be even less practical.  
Nevertheless, should the Ugandan debt market develop with standardized issues of long term (ideally CPI 
indexed) bonds, a revision of the menu of retirement benefits would be justified. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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assumed to further decrease to a level of 0.7% due to a modest increase in asset 
management competition.
21 
¾  No types of guarantees are provided. 
¾  Two variants are modeled for the assumed real interest rate earned on individual 
accounts (gross of administrative costs): 5% (Reform I.1A) and 3% (Reform 
I.1B).  The two variants reflect the need to assess the probability that accumulated 
funds will be mismanaged.
22 
The impact of Reform I.1 on government expenditure
23 is shown in Figure 18 and Figure 
19.  In the current non-contributory scheme all pension system payments are financed 
from the state budget.  After the reform the government will have to cover the payment of 
the pension rights accrued under the old system and pay contributions to the new scheme 
as an employer (10% of the wages). 
                                                 
21 The high ratio of total costs over assets is explained by the maturity (or lack of) the new system.  The fast 
growth of assets under management would rapidly lower the ratio due to the mainly fixed costs involved in 
managing a pool of assets.  The long-run estimate of 0.7% ratio of total administrative costs over assets 
compares with high cost mandatory systems (like Chile).  The marketing cost component included in most 
Latin American systems does not obviously apply to the new civil servant scheme in Uganda.  One would 
therefore expect a lower cost structure.  However, even in the good state of the world, the small (in $ terms) 
pool of assets that the reformed civil servant scheme will generate is not likely to attract highly competitive 
asset managers.  This justifies the long run assumption of total costs over assets of 0.7%. 
22 Here, the choice of 3% real rate of return yields a zero differential with real wage growth.  In essence, we 
consider the new scheme “mismanaged” if it yields a rate of return equal to the rate of return that can be 
obtained in the unreformed scheme.  The definition of the bad state of the world is at all effects subjective 
and one can easily imagine a state of the world where the real returns on assets are negative.  It is 
straightforward to have a qualitative idea of how replacement rates will behave for lower rates of return. 
23 The two variants – with higher and lower rate of return – have obviously no differential impact on 
government expenditure. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 18: Pure DC reform with immediate switching decreases 
considerably Government expenditure for civil servants, particularly in 































Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
Figure 19: Pure DC reform with immediate switching decreases 
considerably government expenditure for teachers, except for the very 































Notes: Comparisons of government expenditure for teachers – baseline with Reform I.1A (% of GDP). 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 53 -   
In the short run, the cost to the government of the reformed system will slightly exceed 
the projected costs under a no-reform scenario.  The decline in pension payments is not 
significant enough to offset the contribution payments to the provident fund which under 
the Reform I.1 variant will have to be paid for all active members.  In the medium term, 
saving on the decreasing payments of the accrued rights more than compensates for the 
contribution payments that increase in line with the increasing wage bill.  In the long run, 
after the accrued right have been practically paid out in full, government expenditure 
changes in line with the covered wage bill stabilizing at around 1.1% of GDP.  The 
projected time path of the two components of government expenditure after the reform is 
plotted in Figure 20 and Figure 21. 
Figure 20: Payment of accrued rights and contributions for civil servants 




































Source: WB calculations based on PROST Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 21: Payment of accrued rights and contributions for teachers – 




































Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
In the reformed system, benefits will be paid out of two sources: from the old defined 
benefit scheme in the form of accrued pension rights and from the new scheme as phased 
withdrawal based on the individual’s accumulated balance.  In the shorter run, while the 
value of benefits is dominated by the defined benefit component, replacement rates are 
higher.  In the longer run, with the prevailing defined contribution component, the 
expected benefit becomes more modest compared to what is promised by the current 
system.   
For example, under a quite optimistic assumption of 5% rate of return, by the time the 
new system matures, the flow of retirees can expect replacement rates of about 60% for 
civil servants and 50% for teachers.  These are substantially lower compared to around 
82%-85% that the same retirees would have obtained in the unreformed scheme.  
Pensions for the stock of retirees in the reformed scheme will decrease even more 
compared to the baseline due to the fact that price indexation increases the value of 
pensions by less than average wages.  Replacement rates for the stock of old age 
pensioners projected for variant Reform I.1A (with 5% real interest rate) are compared 
with the baseline (no-reform) scenario in Figure 22 and Figure 23.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 22: In a pure DC reform with immediate switching replacement 





























Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage; ** Comparison of replacement rates* 
for stock of retirees for civil servants – baseline with Reform I.1A. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 23: In a pure DC reform with immediate switching replacement 





























Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage; ** Comparison of replacement rates 
for stock of retirees for teachers – baseline with Reform I.1A. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   
Notice that we are comparing replacement rates produced by the reduced pension in the 
baseline with the replacement rates produced by the full pension in the reformed scheme.  
This would appear a rather drastic reduction in post-reform benefits relative to those 
projected with the generous benefit formula and indexation rules of the current scheme.   
The interest rate earned on individual accounts is one of the key factors determining 
benefits in a defined contribution scheme.  To illustrate how sensitive expected benefits 
are to financial market performance as well as the management of fund reserves, a less 
optimistic variant Reform I.1B is modeled.  Under this scenario, assets accrue a 3% real 
rate of return.  Given the current international experiences in the management of public 
pension fund reserves, even 3% real rate of return may turn out to be optimistic. 
With real wage growth assumptions being the same, the difference between the real 
interest rate and real wage growth – one of the key determinants of the expected 
replacement rates – drops to zero in variant I.1B compared to about 2 percentage points 
in variant I.1A.  The two percentage point difference in the assumed real rate of return 
has a substantial impact on benefits resulting in the replacement rates reduction of up to 
12-15 percentage points in variant I.1.B compared to variant I.1.A.  The impact of 
changes in the assumed rate of return on the defined contribution component of old age 
benefit is illustrated in Figure 24 and Figure 25. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 24: In a pure DC reform, rate of return on assets makes a big 



























ref I.1A ref I.1B
 
Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage; Comparison of replacement rates in 
the DC component for civil servants – Reform I.1A with I.1B. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 25: In a pure DC reform, rate of return on assets makes a big 
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Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage; ** Comparison of replacement rates* 
in the DC component for teachers – Reform I.1A with I.1B. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST. 
V.A.2  Reforms I.2 and I.3 
Same shift to a pure provident fund but with a different transition path is modeled in the 
Reform I.2 and Reform I.3 scenarios: 
¾  Only new entrants join the new system. 
¾  Only one variant is modeled with respect to the assumed real interest rate earned 
on individual accounts (5%).  The qualitative impact previously discussed if 
assets are mismanagement obviously applies in this reform scenario as well. 
¾  All other design features assumed to be the same as in Reform I.1. 
The only difference between the two scenarios is the indexation rules in the remaining 
old system: 
Reform I.2: same indexation rules (wage indexation) as in the current system; 
Reform I.3: price indexation applied to full pensions with no indexation applied to the 
commuted part 
The impact of the transition path can be seen by comparing Reform I.2 and I.1A.  In the 
first years, government obligations in the former are lower as with gradual transition 
contributions will have to be paid only for few new employees who join the system after 
the reform.  However, later in the future the option with gradual transition becomes much 
more costly than the radical shift given that the contributions required to be paid to the An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 59 -   
new scheme pick up fast while pension payments decrease more slowly than in Reform 
I.1 (in fact, pension payments continue growing over the first three decades).  The impact 
on government expenditure is presented in Figure 26 and Figure 27.   
Figure 26: Pure DC reforms make Government expenditure for civil 
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Notes: * Comparison of Government expenditure for civil servants – Reform I.1A, I.2 with baseline (% 
of GDP). 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 27: Pure DC reforms make Government expenditure for teachers 
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Notes: * Comparison of Government expenditure for teachers – Reform I.1A, I.2 with baseline (% of 
GDP). 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   
From the expected benefit point of view, Reform I.2 may sound more appealing to 
current system members, but only assuming the government manages to cope with the 
fiscal pressure which may exceed even the baseline projections during some periods in 
the medium term.   
Replacement rates for those staying in the old scheme are compared with replacement 
rates projected for funded scheme members in Figure 28 and Figure 29.  Here, 
replacement rates are calculated as a percentage of the group average wage for the total 
covered population in both the old and the new scheme.  One may notice that members of 
the defined benefit scheme obtain somewhat higher replacement rates compared to the 
baseline scenario.  This can be explained by the assumed changes in behavior resulting in 
changes in the age distribution of new retirees: once the system is closed to new entrants, 
the average retirement age and hence the average wage and length of service of new 
retirees increase producing higher replacement rates in terms of the general group 
average wage. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 28: In a pure DC reform for only new entrants, replacement 





























Notes: * Average pension as percentage of the group average wage; ** Comparison of replacement 
rates in Reform I.2 for civil servants – switchers with non-switchers. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 29: In a pure DC reform for only new entrants’ replacement 





























Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage; ** Comparison of replacement rates in 
Reform I.2 for teachers – switchers with non-switchers. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   
The cost of wage indexation in the remaining old scheme was estimated by comparing 
Reform I.2 and Reform I.3.  With the real wage growth assumed to be positive 
throughout the simulation period, wage indexation may increase pension expenditure by 
up to 0.1% of GDP, as illustrated in Figure 30 and Figure 31.  On the other hand, price 
indexation may drastically reduce average replacement rates for the stock of retirees 
remaining in the defined benefit scheme (Figure 32 and Figure 33). An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 30: Price indexation lowers Government expenditure for civil 
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Notes: ** Comparison of Government expenditure for civil servants – Reform I.2 with I.3 (% of GDP). 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   
Figure 31: Price indexation lowers Government expenditure for teachers 
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Notes: ** Comparison of Government expenditure for teachers – Reform I.2 with I.3 (% of GDP). 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 32: Price indexation is another way to gradually decreasing 
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Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage; ** Comparison of replacement rates 
for civil servants - Reform I.2 with I.3. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 33: Price indexation is another way to gradually decreasing 
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Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage; ** Comparison of replacement rates 
for teachers - Reform I.2 with I.3. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   
V.B Transforming PSPF into a mixed scheme (Reform II)  
The reform from the current monopillar PAYG defined benefit scheme to a two-pillar 
scheme is modeled as one of the possible alternatives to a drastic shift to a pure fully 
funded defined contribution system.  The first pillar in this provisional reform scenario is 
suggested to be a funded defined benefit component, the second – a fully funded defined 
contribution scheme similar to the previous reform scenario, though smaller in size.   
Similar to the pure defined contribution reform scenario, simulations are done for two 
extreme cases of the transition path: 1) everybody moves to the new scheme in the year 
of reform (Reform II.1); and 2) only new entrants go to the new scheme with current (as 
of the year of the reform) active members staying in the old system (Reform II.2). 
V.B.1 Reform  II.1 
The main design features of this hybrid reform scenario are as follows: 
¾  Reform starts in 2007. 
¾  Everybody switches to the new system. 
¾  Pension rights accrued under the old system are treated the same way as in 
Reform I.1. 
¾  The contribution rate is 15%: 5% paid by employee, 10% by employer.  
Contributions are split between two pillars: up to a specified ceiling they go to the Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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first pillar
24 and above the ceiling – to the second pillar,
25 so the contribution 
ceiling in the first pillar equals the contribution floor in the second pillar. 
¾  The ceiling/floor is set at two times the average wage in the year of the reform 
with further indexation to prices until it reaches the minimum wage,
26 remaining 
equal to the minimum wage thereafter. 
¾  First pillar: 
  Vesting period 10 years; 
  2% annual accrual rate; 
  Maximum replacement rate = 80% of the reference wage defined in next 
bullet; 
  Reference wage for benefit calculation = individual’s last wage subject to 
the ceiling; 
  Pensions are indexed to prices; 
  Pension commutation is not allowed; 
  Pension fund reserves accumulated in the first pillar are invested at the 
same interest rate as in the funded component. 
¾  Second pillar: 
  Except for the abovementioned contribution floor, the second pillar design 
is the same as in the pure DC scenario. 
  Like for Reform I.1, two variants are modeled for the assumed real interest 
rate earned on individual accounts (gross): 5% (variant II.1A) and 3% 
(variant II.1B). 
¾  Retirement pattern is assumed to change the same way and for the same reasons 
as in the pure DC scenario. 
The defined benefit pillar is more modest than the current scheme due to a less generous 
benefit formula as well as to the ceiling imposed on pensionable income.  Over time, the 
ceiling indexation downsizes the defined benefit component even further and eventually 
transforms the initially earnings related benefit into a flat pension for everybody meeting 
the eligibility criteria.
27 Towards the end of the simulation period an average new retiree 
                                                 
24 Essentially a downsized DB contributory PSPF. 
25 The two pillars could be managed by the same institution or be completely separate where civil servants 
are allowed to contribute to a national provident fund or a private sector DC plan.  The important thing is 
that the first pillar is a DB scheme while the second pillar is a DC scheme. 
26 In the simulations, by minimum wage we understand the lowest wage received by the covered 
population.  The ceiling/floor is projected to reach the minimum wage by 2059 in the civil servants sub-
scheme and by 2053 in the teachers sub-scheme. 
27 Indexing the contribution ceiling to prices has the advantage of achieving a “pure defined contribution 
reform” in a very gradual fashion with the added bonus of introducing an earning-related flat benefit (flat 
benefit per year of service) for all members.  With price indexation, the ceiling is expected to reach the 
minimum wage after 45 years from the reform. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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is projected to obtain from the first pillar around 13-15% of the unconstrained
28 average 
wage regardless of his/her income.  Notice that, by international standards, this is a low 
replacement rate for a first pillar DB pension.  However, due to the design of the ceiling 
indexation the first pillar is being gradually phased out in a minimum pension affine to a 
sort of a flat benefit.  13-15% of the average wage may be a reasonable level for a 
guaranteed minimum pension. 
If the new defined benefit component is not in deficit, the government expenditure in 
Reform II.1 will be exactly the same as in Reform I.1.  This is due to the fact that the 
switching pattern is the same (everybody switches to the new scheme), accrued rights are 
calculated and paid out in the same way, and the contributions paid to the new scheme 
are the same (same number of active members with the same wages).  In both variants 
II.1A (5% real interest rate) and II.1B (3% real interest rate) the defined benefit pillar is 
projected to be in surplus accumulating reserves throughout the simulation period 
comparable with the second pillar reserves.  Even in the case of zero nominal rate of 
return on first pillar reserves investments, the current balance will remain positive almost 
until 2075.  The main factor contributing to that is the accelerated coverage expansion 
assumed between 2015 and 2050.   
In summary, from the costs-to-the-government point of view Reform II may be 
equivalent to the pure DC reform scenario.  However, for beneficiaries the outcomes may 
be different, especially for lower income groups.  Table 12 compares average 
replacement rates projected for the last few years of the simulation period (when the new 
scheme matures) for the stock of old age pensioners under Reform I.1 and Reform II.1 
with 5% and 3% assumed as the real interest rate earned on individual accounts.   
Table 12: Projected average replacement rates* for the stock of retirees (average 
over 2070 – 2075)  
5% interest rate  3% interest rate   
government teachers government teachers 
Reform I.1  42% 33% 27% 21% 
Reform II.1**  42% 40% 34% 35% 
Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage, **Combined replacement rate from two pillars 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
Under a more favorable investment return assumption (5% real), teachers – earning on 
average less than civil servants – would be better off in a two-pillar scheme rather than in 
a pure defined contribution, whereas for higher income groups the outcomes are likely to 
be similar.  However, if invested funds can only earn 3% real, all groups would fair better 
under the two-pillar scheme, with lower income groups gaining more than higher income 
groups.  Thus, the first pillar will perform redistributive function providing some sort of a 
minimum pension guarantee which is not stipulated in Reform I.  In addition, it provides 
some insurance against investment risk for system participants. 
V.B.2 Reform  II.2 
Similar to Reform I, a gradual transition path is modeled for the two-pillar reform 
scenario assuming that the new two-pillar scheme is introduced only for employees 
                                                 
28 Unconstrained wage=wage before the ceiling/floor is applied Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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joining the system after the reform.  Only one variant is modeled with respect to benefit 
indexation and rate of return: wage indexation in the remaining old scheme and 5% real 
interest rate on investments.   
Compared to the immediate switching for all, allowing only new entrants to join the new 
scheme will have the same impact on expenditure as discussed in the pure defined 
contribution reform scenario.  The impact on government expenditure is presented in 
Figure 34 and Figure 35.   
Figure 34: Hybrid reforms lowers Government expenditure for civil 
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Source: * Comparison of Government expenditure for civil servants – Reform II.1A, II.2 with baseline 
(as % of GDP). 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Figure 35: Hybrid reforms lowers Government expenditure for teachers 
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Notes: * Comparison of Government expenditure for teachers – Reform II.1A, II.2 with baseline (as % 
of GDP). 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST.   
It is very important to notice that Figure 34 is identical to Figure 26, and Figure 35 is 
identical to Figure 27.  This indicates that since the first pillar remains in surplus 
throughout the simulation period, government expenditure in Reform II.2 will be the 
same as in Reform I.2.  Similarly, government expenditures in Reform I.1A will be the 
same as in Reform II.1A.  The reason for this is due to the fact that when the first pillar in 
surplus, the only source of expenditure is represented by: 1) wages; 2) the 10% 
contribution rate for the government to the new scheme; and 3) the pension expenditure 
for the grandfathered workers under the old scheme.  Wages and the 10% contribution 
rate are identical under all reforms modeled here.  However, the pension expenditure for 
the grandfathered workers under the old scheme is identical, for given expected rate of 
return on assets, respectively in Reforms I.2 and II.2, and in Reforms I.1A and II.1A.  
This is because the grandfathering rules are the same.  Expenditure will be identically 
higher than in Reforms II.2A and I.2 because workers who are active on the date of 
reform will continue accruing pension rights until they retire under the old, more 
generous, rules. 
While the hybrid and pure DC have the same impact on pension expenditure (for given 
grandfathering rules, of course), the hybrid is likely to produce higher replacement rates 
than the pure DC reform  With gradual transition, replacement rates for non switchers are 
the same as for non switchers in the pure DC reform.  This is true because accrued rights 
are calculated in the same way.  However, for switchers replacement rates will be higher 
in the hybrid reform option, especially for lower income groups, due to the insurance Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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component of the defined benefit first pillar.  The following figure reports replacement 
rates for the stock of retirees in Reform II.2.   
Figure 36: Comparison of replacement rates* for civil servant switchers– 
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Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage 
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Figure 37: Comparison of replacement rates* for teacher switchers– 
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Notes: * Average pension as percentage of average group wage 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
With the similar cost to the government, the two-pillar approach may be more beneficial 
for lower income members through the redistributive defined benefit component and for 
all income groups by reducing investment risks for plan members. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper analyzes the future liabilities that the Ugandan Public Service Pensions Fund 
might accumulate under the provisions of CAP 286, unless it is reformed over a period of 
70 years.  The results for the baseline (no-reform) scenario clearly show that the current 
public sector scheme is not sustainable and needs reforming.  The system already 
imposes a heavy burden on government finances and the society at large, and, if no 
changes are made to it in the near future, the fiscal pressure will continue to grow 
exponentially thus increasing the risk of system’s default on its promises. 
These conclusions are, of course, very well known to Ugandan policy makers.  It is less 
known, however, how generous the PSPF scheme is and how much it costs to the tax 
payer.  Section IV provides a quantitative assessment of these issues.  Under specific 
economic, demographic and recruitment assumptions discussed in APPENDIX A and 
agreed upon with Ugandan officials and policy makers, the system is analyzed in terms of 
replacement rates, government expenditure, contributions required to rebalance the 
scheme, and the implicit pension debt. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Table 13: Summary policy considerations under alternative reform options / 1 
Fiscal 
impact 
Fully contributory reform.  The pure provident fund reform with immediate switching and price 
indexation for switchers has the strongest impact on government expenditure, identical to the 
hybrid with same grandfathering rules.  Tax revenues will only needed to pay for wages, 10% of 
contributions, and accrued rights under the old scheme.  Government expenditure is expected to 
decrease in the short term and increase again to about 1% of GDP in the long run.  If more generous 




The pure provident fund reform with immediate switching and price indexation for switchers 
reduces average expected replacement rates more than the hybrid reform with same 
grandfathering rules.  These are expected to fall rapidly to around 42% for civil servants and 33% for 
teachers in the high interest rate scenario of 5% real for the next 70 years.  If more generous 
grandfathering rules are adopted, average replacement rates will increase proportionally but only in the 





































Weak governance may expose accumulated funds to under political influence.  Under a more 
realistic scenario of 3% real return replacement rates are expected to fall to about 27% for civil 
servants and about 21% for teachers. 
 
Members fully bear investment risk. 
  
The scheme provides no longevity insurance.  In addition, if members  were to voluntarily annuitize 
cash balances, they would bear annuitization risk.  The current financial market institutions are unable 
to safely provide private sector annuities. 
 
The pure provident fund reform rapidly lowers expected replacement rates, thus not appealing to 
current workers, including members of Parliament. 
 
Capacity of MPS needs strengthening to forecast pension expenditure in the short run and manage 




Fully contributory reform.  The hybrid reform with immediate switching and price indexation for 
switchers has the strongest impact on government expenditure, identical to the pure provident 
fund reform with same grandfathering rules as long as the first pillar is not in deficit.  Tax 
revenues will only needed to pay for wages, 10% of contributions, and accrued rights under the old 
scheme.  Government expenditure is expected to lower in the short term and increase to again to 
about 1% of GDP in the long run.  If more generous grandfathering rules are adopted government 




Average expected replacement rates in the hybrid reform with immediate switching and price 
indexation for switchers are higher than in the pure provident fund reform with same 
grandfathering rules.  It will provide long run expected replacement of about 42% and about 40% for 


































Weak governance may expose accumulated funds to undue political influence.  Under a more 
realistic scenario of 3% real return on assets, replacement rates are expected to fall to about 34% for 
civil servants and 35% for teachers.  These are still higher than the expected replacement rates 
projected in the pure provident fund reform under the same interest rate scenario. 
 
DB parameters (benefit indexation, contribution ceiling indexation and benefit formula parameters) 
can be easily manipulated unless MPS develops strong modeling capacity to provide quantitative 
answers to policy reform alternatives. 
 
The hybrid reform provides a minimum longevity insurance unobtainable in the private sector. 
 
The hybrid reform reduces the exposure of members to investment risk. 
 
The hybrid reform ensures a more gradual transition to lower replacement rates, thus appealing 
more to current workers, including members of Parliament. 
  
Capacity of MPS needs strengthening to forecast pension expenditure in the short and long run for 
the DB component, will need to manage a more complex scheme including outsourcing of asset 
management 
 
Notes:  1/ This is a summary of 7 alternative reform options discussed in the text.  All numbers reported are indicative 
and would vary according to the specific scenario chosen.  We refer to the text for a complete discussion of all the 
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This paper then discusses alternative reform options that can be used as input in 
designing an educated homegrown reform of the fund.  The paper supports a hybrid (two-
pillar) reform option composed by a small defined benefit scheme and a complementary 
defined contribution scheme, instead of a pure defined contribution (monopillar) reform 
option discussed by policymakers in the country.  The main reason for this is related to 
the fact that hybrid and pure defined contribution reforms will have the same impact on 
reducing pension expenditure (for same grandfathering rules and as long as the first pillar 
is not in deficit).  In addition, everything else being equal, the hybrid reform is likely to 
produce higher average replacement rates due to the redistributive and pooling properties 
of the small DB pillar.  The main advantages and disadvantages of the two reform options 
are summarized in the previous table. 
Reforming the PSPF into a pure provident fund. 
Reforming the PSPF into a pure provident fund with immediate switching of current 
workers and price indexation of benefits has the strongest impact in relieving fiscal 
pressure in the medium and long run.  Government expenditure is expected to remain 
constant at around 1% of GDP over the whole simulation period.  Notice, however that 
the fiscal impact is identical under the hybrid reform option for same grandfathering 
rules. 
At the same time, replacement rates would also decrease very rapidly.  In the scenario 
with a high rate of return on assets replacement rates for the flow of retirees gradually 
decrease to 60% of average wage in the long run, less in the low rate of return scenario.  
Price indexation would further reduce replacement rates to 40% to 50% of average wage 
for the stock of retirees.  Members of Parliament, currently not covered by any scheme, 
will need to join the reformed scheme and may not support a reform that reduces benefits 
too rapidly.  Finally, current civil servants may oppose, through lobbying, and even stall 
the reform process while seeking a compromise between budget alleviation and pension 
adequacy. 
The provident fund option entails also some important risks.  Replacement rates purely 
depend on realized returns on accumulated assets.  A high rate of 5% real return on assets 
over the next 70 years is needed to support average replacement rates of 40% to 50% 
unless the covered population is prepared to contribute more than 15% of wages.  This 
sustained high rate of return is considered unrealistic if the past experience of NSSF is 
taken as an example of the probable performance of the new scheme.  Hence, it will be 
likely that ex post replacement rate will be much lower than what targeted, making the 
provident fund reform option undesirable from the point of view of benefit adequacy.  In 
our simulations, the use of a 3% real return reduces end of period expected replacement 
rates for civil servants and teachers to 27% and 21%, respectively. 
Though in relative terms a 40% to 50% replacement rate appears to be adequate, it 
implies rather low benefits in absolute terms (money value) as wages in the public sector 
are very low when compared to the economy wide average.  This indicates that the 
reform of the PSPF should be accompanied by a reform of the civil service.  The lack of 
progress in the comprehensive reform of the civil servant remuneration and hiring policy, 
together with the serious governance problems experienced by the NSSF in the past make Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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a pure DC reform of the PSPF impractical.  All this strongly suggests two related policy 
recommendations:  
A.  a reform of the civil servant salary structure needs considering at the same time as 
the reform of the PSPF so that pay and pensions are considered integral, rather 
than separate, elements of compensation; and  
B.  a pure DC reform, irrespective of the switching patterns, should not be considered 
by the Ugandan authorities due to the inadequate retirement benefits that it is 
likely to produce. 
Reforming the PSPF into a two pillar scheme. 
The hybrid or two-pillar reform option mitigates some of the undesirable properties of the 
provident fund option.  The hybrid reform will provide higher expected replacement rates 
than the pure provident fund option due to the redistributive and pooling (insurance) 
properties of the small defined benefit first pillar. At the same time, the hybrid reform has 
the same impact in reducing government expenditure for given grandfathering rules.  The 
reason for this is due to the fact that when the first pillar is not in deficit, the only source 
of government expenditure is represented by: 1) wages; 2) the 10% contribution rate for 
the government to the new scheme; and 3) the pension expenditure for the grandfathered 
workers under the old scheme.  Wages and the 10% contribution rate are identical under 
both reform options.  Hence, pension expenditure is only determined by the 
grandfathering rules that policymakers will adopt.  Immediate switching with price 
indexation of benefits has the strongest impact in reducing pension expenditure.  
Allowing only new entrants to join the new scheme will have the weakest impact in 
reducing government expenditure. 
In addition, the hybrid reform provides other benefits.  It provides a minimum annuity 
benefit, hence longevity insurance, in an environment not likely to be able to safely 
support privately managed annuities for the foreseeable future.  It facilitates the 
introduction of a sort of a minimum pension over the long run due to the effect of price 
indexation of the ceiling on contributions to the defined benefit component.  It has better 
risk sharing properties when compared with the pure provident fund reform option as it 
maintains a modest intergenerational risk sharing dimension. 
The hybrid reform also entails risks.  The presence of a DB component leaves the door 
open for manipulation of DB parameters: especially of the benefit indexation, 
contribution ceiling indexation and defined benefit formula parameters.  This risk should 
be mitigated by increasing the preparation and influence of MPS staff in analyzing the 
impact of pension variables and requiring their technical input in amending laws and 
regulations affecting the scheme.  In addition, and similarly to the pure provident fund 
option, it entails the risk that poor governance of asset management will produce 
unsatisfactory average rates of return.  This second risk is partly mitigated by the 
presence of a DB scheme. 
The specific switching pattern that should be introduced in this type of the reform 
warrants further investigation than what is allowed in this study.  It is likely not to be 
reasonable for everyone to switch to the new system, especially for workers close to 
retirement and earnings close to the ceiling.  These individuals would be accruing very An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
     
  - 75 -   
small account balances in the DC component of the reformed scheme and high 
administrative costs will be incurred to maintain a high number of individual accounts 
with small balances.  At the same time, the extreme case of introducing the new system 
only for new entrants is costly, possibly more than the baseline, especially in the short-to 
medium term.  It is likely that an intermediate policy of allowing only older age workers 
to stay in the old system while moving younger employees in the new scheme will 
provide the needed compromise between the need to reduce fiscal expenditure and create 
political consensus in support of the reform. 
The considerations made in this second part of the conclusions suggest the following 
policy recommendations: 
A.  A hybrid type of reform is more likely to provide adequate replacement rates than 
a pure DC reform as it provides a minimum longevity insurance that the private 
sector is likely not to be able to provide until the financial sector has reached a 
very different stage of development.  The complementary DC component would 
grow at a lower rate giving time for financial sector development policies to be 
implemented. 
B.  The presence of a DB component leaves the door open for manipulation of DB 
parameters.  This risk should be mitigated by increasing the preparation and 
influence of MPS staff in analyzing the impact of pension variables and requiring 
their technical input in amending laws and regulations affecting the scheme. 
C.  A contribution wage ceiling, indexed to prices, should be introduced to gradually 
reduce contributions to the DB component in line with ageing of the covered 
population and the development of the financial market.  Ultimately, the effect of 
this policy would be to introduce a minimum pension for civil servants. 
D.  Careful modeling will be needed to select those grandfathering rules that 
adequately trade-off the need to reduce government expenditure with the need to 
create political consensus in support of the reform. 
The quantitative comparison of key indicators under all the different reform options and 
variants modeled in this paper is summarized in the next table: 
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Table 14: Summary of the key performance indicators for alternative reform scenarios 
 
  Scenarios 
 





% of GDP* 
  Baseline  Existing DB scheme  68/70%  4.5% 
Reform I.1  Pure DC reform with immediate switching.  Price indexation 
for switchers and current retirees.   
Variant I.1.A: high rate of return on assets 











Reform I.2  Pure DC reform for only new entrants with wage indexation 
for grandfathered employees and current retirees.  Price 
indexation for switchers.  Assumed high rate of return on 










































Reform I.3  Pure DC reform for only new entrants with price indexation 
for grandfathered employees and current retirees.  Price 










Reform II.1  Hybrid reform with immediate switching.  Price indexation for 
switchers and current retirees.  Assumed high rate of return 
on assets. 
Variant II.1.A: high rate of return on assets 









































Reform II.2  Hybrid reform for only new entrants with wage indexation for 
grandfathered employees and current retirees.  Price 








Notes: * In the long run (towards the end of the simulation period); ** Though in Reform I.2 replacement rates and expenditures at the end of the simulation period are the same as 
in Reform I.1.A, they are higher in the interim due to gradual transition to the new system (see Figures 26-29); *** Though in Reform I.3 replacement rates and expenditures at the 
end of the simulation period are the same as in Reform I.2, they are lower in the interim due to price indexation of pensions (see Figures 30-33); **** Government expenditure is 
identical under reforms I.1 and II.1 and under I.2 and II.2, respectively. 
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Other important considerations 
In all reform options assets will be accumulated over a period of time that largely exceeds 
the simulation period.  Weak governance standards raise concerns about the sense of 
reform proposals that imply rapid accumulation of assets.  Within the pure defined 
contribution reform proposal this issue can be addressed by reducing the contribution rate 
to the reformed scheme.  Accumulated assets will be lower but so also the replacement 
rates.  Within the hybrid reform proposal this issue can be addressed by either varying the 
relative size and the design of the defined benefit and defined contribution components or 
by varying the rate of decay of the contribution ceiling (or both).  In this way an 
acceptable balance can be found with respect to costs versus adequate pension and with 
respect to different types of risks related to the types of pillars.  Obviously, a trade-off 
exists between keeping a pension scheme unfunded or partially funded to address 
governance concerns and the fiscal pressure that this policy option creates on government 
finances.   
The administration of the reformed scheme will require drastically improved data quality 
relatively to what we have been allowed to use for this study. 
Finally, our study aimed at carefully describing the result of important policy/design 
choices including, but not limited to: 1) alternative retirement benefit financing 
mechanisms; 2) switching patterns; and 3) indexation mechanisms.  The Ugandan 
authorities would need to further refine the analysis to develop home grown reform 
options that satisfy the equity, economic, financial, and political economic constraints in 
Uganda.  For instance, an analysis of replacement rates for individual workers with 
different characteristics would allow policy makers to ascertain benefit adequacy for 
other workers beyond the average, representative, worker. 
These last considerations suggest the following final policy recommendations: 
A.  Governance of public pension fund management needs improving independently 
of whether the PSPF scheme is reformed or not. 
B.  Rapid progress needs achieving in implementing the integrated personnel and 
payroll system project. 
C.  Careful considerations need to be made regarding the data requirement for 
administering the new scheme. 
D.  Refinement of the analysis carried out in this study is warranted by the Ugandan 
authorities.  This would enable the finalization of a home grown reform option 
and improved assessment of benefit adequacy for different types of workers. 
Irrespectively of the reform that the Ugandan authorities will implement capacity within 
MPS will need to be strengthened to manage the reformed scheme.  This will entail 
improving quality of data, creating adequate IT infrastructure, creating modeling capacity 
to forecast pension expenditure and liabilities or to advise policymakers on eventual 
reforms that will inevitably be carried out in the future.  It is crucial that any future 
reform will only be adopted on the basis of well understood and accepted quantitative 
projections. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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APPENDIX A PROJECTION METHODOLOGY AND KEY 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Projection methodology 
Financial projections were carried out for the Public Service Pension Fund of Uganda 
under a no-reform scenario (baseline scenario) to assess pension liabilities of the current 
system assuming it does not change.  Also, several reform scenarios were modeled and 
evaluated using the baseline scenario as a benchmark.   
The World Bank Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit (PROST) model, version 
12, was used for the projections.  PROST is a computer-based pension model designed to 
simulate the behavior of pension systems and assess their financial sustainability under 
different economic and demographic assumptions over a long time frame.  The model can 
be adapted to a wide range of country circumstances and it allows us to model various 
types of pension reform options.  A general description of the model can be found in 
APPENDIX D. 
The simulation horizon spans from fiscal year 2003/2004 (the base year) to fiscal year 
2075/2076 (the ending year) – approximately a lifetime of one generation which is 
viewed to be an adequate length for pension system modeling.  As with any simulation 
model, the outcome from PROST depends largely on the nature and quality of data and 
assumptions used in the making of projections.  Three main groups of assumptions are 
important in pension modeling: (1) macroeconomic and labor market; (2) demographic; 
and (3) pension system related variables.  The key assumptions used in the projections for 
the PSPF and summary results are presented in the next sections. 
Macroeconomic and covered wage growth assumptions 
Macroeconomic variables highly influence future projections.  In the short- to medium 
term, IMF macroeconomic projections for Uganda were used for assumptions regarding 
GDP growth, inflation rate, and discount rate.  In the long run, it is assumed that the 
Ugandan economy reaches a steady state with real GDP growing at about 3.5% and 
inflation stabilizing at 3.5%.  Average wage in the private sector is assumed to increase in 
line with GDP per capita growth.  The macroeconomic assumptions used in the 
simulations are summarized in Table 15.  These assumptions can be considered to be a 
moderate economic growth scenario.  It is always advisable to experiment with various 
scenarios for the time paths of the main economic variables (i.e., a more and/or a less 
optimistic economic growth scenarios) which was not done in the presented set of 
simulations but may be considered in the future. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Table 15: Macroeconomic assumptions  
Year 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2010/11 2020/21 2030/31 2075/76
Real GDP Growth 5.4% 6.2% 6.1% 6.6% 6.0% 6.0% 3.5% 3.5%
Real GDP/Capita Growth 2.8% 3.6% 3.6% 4.1% 3.6% 3.9% 2.1% 2.7%
Real Wage* Growth 2.8% 3.6% 3.6% 4.1% 3.6% 3.9% 2.1% 2.7%
Inflation Rate 5.9% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
Discount Rate 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
* Average wage in the private sector  
 
Short- to medium-term assumptions regarding wage growth for the covered population 
were obtained from MPS (2005).  The 2001 PRP set target salary levels based on the 
comprehensive 1999 job evaluation exercise.  The 2001 PRP targeted real salary 
increases ranging between 41% and 78% for professional public officers at entry graduate 
job grades;  between 19% and 37%for senior levels of professional and technical skilled 
jobs; around 17% for heads of department; and no nominal salary increase for Permanent 
Secretaries, directors and legal professional.
29  The PRP was supposed to be implemented 
within the subsequent three years with target salary levels to reach 75% of private sector 
salary levels of equivalent categories.  The implementation of the PRP was delayed due 
to lack of funding.
30 Given the salary increases observed between 2002 and 2004, MPS 
expects that the 2001 PRP be implemented within 10 years. 
Already with the delayed implementation, the public sector wage bill as a percentage of 
GDP increased between 1% in 1987 to 5.1% in the fiscal year 2003/05.  As a way of 
comparison, public sector wage bill in sub-Saharan countries was just under 6% of GDP 
in 1996.  This ratio is marginally higher than the average 5% observed in Asian and Latin 
American countries.
31  The public sector wage bill as a share of current expenditure 
increased in Uganda from 29% in 1996 to 38% in the fiscal year of 2003/04.  This is 
marginally higher than the 35% average in Sub-Saharan countries.
32 
The current ratio of wage bill over GDP or current public expenditure do not suggest that 
the 2001 PRP can be implemented in the short run.  Hence, in the PROST simulation we 
adopted the MPS wage growth projections until 2014/15 (Table 16).   
Table 16: Assumed average wage growth for the covered population  
Year 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Real Average Covered Wage* Growth
Government employees 1.2% 3.6% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.4%
Teachers 3.0% 5.4% 3.2% 3.2% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8%
Real Private Sector Av.Wage Growth 2.8% 3.6% 3.6% 4.1% 3.9% 3.7% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7%
*Average Covered Wage=average wage received by the covered population  
 
Reaching the target 75% of the private sector salary level in the long run would require – 
under the above macroeconomic assumptions – an average annual growth of wages in the 
public sector by about 4% (real) over a period of 60 years which does not seem to be 
                                                 
29 For details of background and rationale supporting our wage growth assumptions see MPS (2005)  
30 The projected funding gap for the fiscal year 2006/07 is already UGS 75 billion, or 9% of projected wage 
bill. 
31 See MPS (2005). 
32 See Lienert and Modi (1997). An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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realistic.  Therefore, for the long term, the real average covered wage growth rate was 
assumed to stabilize at a more moderate level of around 3% – slightly higher than in the 
private sector.  This resulted in an increase of the average covered wage relative to the 
economy wide average wage from the current about 40% and 30% to about 45% and 
40% for civil servants and teachers respectively as shown in Figure 38.  The assumed 
wage growth policy for civil servants and teachers was suggested by and discussed with 
officers in MPS. 
Clearly, the assumption that civil servant salaries remain at a level that is less than 50% 
of private sector average wages for the next 75 years is also a non realistic assumption.  
Low wages do not allow the government to retain qualified staff and promote corruption.  
The reform of the PSPF should be accompanied by a review and reform of the civil 
servant remuneration and hiring policy.  While it is important that these two reforms be 
carried out simultaneously, it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze options for 
reforming the Ugandan civil service.  This analysis is left for future investigation.   
Figure 38 reports the projected average wage for civil servants and teachers as a 
percentage of private sector average wage resulting from the above assumptions. 























































Source: WB calculations 
Demographic assumptions 
Population Projections 
Population projections for Uganda used in the simulations were provided by the World 
Bank’s Population Unit.  In line with the observed international trends, fertility and 
mortality rates are assumed to decrease over time.  The total fertility rate – which is 
currently very high by international standards (about 600%) – is projected to gradually Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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decrease over time reaching the reproduction level of about 210% by 2075.  The assumed 
changes in mortality rates are discussed in more detail in the next section as they play a 
key role not only in the population projections per se but in the projections of life 
expectancy for the population covered by the pension system.  Based on these 
assumptions, the population is projected to grow from the current estimated 24 million to 
about 67 million by the end of the simulation period.   
Mortality table 
As mentioned above, mortality tables are very important in pension system financial 
projections as they determine – through life expectancy changes – how long retirees will 
receive their pensions.  The assumed reduction in age and gender specific mortality rates 
result in an increase in life expectancy as reported in Table 17.  The projected growth of 
life expectancy at birth is relatively rapid: by about 5 years over the next 15 years and by 
11 years over the next 30 years, with life expectancies reaching the level currently 
observed in developed countries by the end of the simulation period.  One of the 
underlying mortality assumptions used in these projections is that the current trend of 
declining HIV prevalence rates will continue and HIV/AIDS will not have any significant 
impact on future mortality rates.  Our discussions with Ugandan demographers confirmed 
this assumption to be reasonable.   
Table 17: Projected life expectancy* for the general population  
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2020 2050 2075
Male
Life expectancy:  At birth 42.5 42.8 43.1 48.2 59.5 70.4
At  Age 20 32.3 32.6 32.9 37.0 45.7 53.0
At  Age 60 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.7 15.0 17.5
At Age 65 10.7 10.7 10.7 11.0 12.0 14.0
Female
Life expectancy:  At birth 43.1 43.4 43.8 48.9 60.6 74.8
At  Age 20 32.7 33.0 33.4 37.4 46.0 56.7
At Age 60 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.1 15.6 20.0
At Age 65 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.2 12.5 16.1  
Notes: *Average remaining years of life expected at specific ages 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST  
In a closed group, like the PSPF, it is very likely that life expectancy of the population 
covered by the pension system significantly differs from that of the general population.  
This is often the case in developing countries where living conditions, including access to 
health care, for civil servants are notably better that for the majority of the population 
resulting in their higher life expectancy.  As life expectancy for the retired population is 
one of the essential determinants of pension system expenditure, financial projections are 
very sensitive to the mortality tables used in the simulations.   
Our consultations with Ugandan demographers strongly supported the idea that civil 
servants in Uganda might on average live longer than the non-covered population.  An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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However, no specific data was available to confirm this supposition.  Under the 
circumstances, two variants of the baseline scenario were modeled to look at the 
sensitivity of the projections to mortality rates assumptions: 1) “baseline variant 1”, using 
the general population mortality rates; and 2) “baseline variant 2”, assuming lower 
mortality rates for civil servants.  Mortality data for various populations groups in India 
were used as a benchmark for variant 2.
33 A 70% mortality multiplier was applied to 
mortality rates for old age pensioners, resulting, e.g., in an increase of life expectancy for 
a 60 year old men in the base year by 3 years.  See Table 18 for the assumed life 
expectancy changes in variant 2. 
Table 18: Projected life expectancy for civil servants   
 
Year 2003 2020 2050 2075
Male
At  Age 60 16.3 16.7 18.0 20.5
At Age 65 13.3 13.6 14.6 16.8
Female
At Age 60 17.0 17.1 18.6 22.9
At Age 65 13.8 13.8 15.2 18.8  
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
Assumptions related to system participants 
As mentioned before, this modeling exercise focused on the assessment of the system’s 
future liabilities leaving out the existing arrears.  All benefits are assumed to be paid in 
full starting from the base year.   
The following benefits are modeled as separate categories: 
•  Regular pensions paid to old age pensioners; 
•  CPG payments to newly retired old age pensioners (all new retirees are assumed 
to choose the CPG and a reduced pension
34); 
•  Regular pensions paid to survivors. 
All other benefits – gratuities paid to survivors, non-CPG gratuities and other types of 
benefits – are modeled in an aggregate way as pension system “other expenses”.  No 
administrative costs are assumed to be borne by the system.  Since the current system is 
non-contributory (the liabilities uniquely financed by the central or local budgets), no 
revenues are modeled in the baseline scenario. 
Active employees and old age pensioners are modeled by tracking each age and gender 
cohort over time, using the initial distributions of system participants by age and gender, 
the assumed hiring policy for active members, retirement probabilities and mortality 
                                                 
33 A mortality study of annuitants conducted by the Life Insurance Corporation in India showed that, for 
example, life expectancy at age 55 for the covered group was 5 years higher than for the general population  
(see World Bank (2001)) 
34 Ugandan experts confirmed that almost everybody chooses this option. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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rates.  Survivors are modeled in an aggregated fashion as a fixed percentage of the total 
covered population. 
Modeling changes in the number of active employees 
Changes in the number of active employees over time are modeled with the use of the 
“flow” method described in APPENDIX D.  Under this method, an exogenous growth 
rate for the total number of employees is assumed, as well as the gender and age 
distribution of new employees joining the pension system.  Subsequently, for each year 
of the simulation period, projections for the number of employees in each age and gender 
cohort based on these assumptions, as well as on the assumed mortality and retirement 
rates.  Currently the number of civil servants is about 0.3% of the Uganda population 
while the number of teachers is about 0.6%.  For the medium term assumptions regarding 
the recruitment policy (until 2014/15), we used recruitment projections contained in MPS 
(2005).  This document discusses the pay reform policy (PRP) of 2001, analyzes the 
progress made in implementing it, and projects average wages and number of civil 
servants and teachers within a framework of the pay reform proposal.  The assumptions 
on the growth of the total number of employed for the medium-term are summarized in 
the Table 19.   
Table 19: Medium term active population growth assumptions  
Year 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Government 70.3 69.7 70.0 70.2 70.5 70.8 71.0 71.2 71.3 71.5 71.7
Tecahers 144.0 146.5 149.1 151.7 154.2 156.8 159.3 161.9 164.5 167.0 170.8
Total 214.3 216.2 219.1 221.9 224.7 227.6 230.3 233.1 235.8 238.5 242.5
Growth rate - Government 0.91% -0.91% 0.39% 0.39% 0.39% 0.39% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26%
Growth rate - Teachers 1.81% 1.78% 1.75% 1.72% 1.69% 1.66% 1.63% 1.61% 1.58% 1.56% 1.50%
Population growth rate 2.55% 2.49% 2.46% 2.42% 2.39% 2.36% 2.34% 2.31% 2.29% 2.26% 2.24% 
Source: PROST projections based on MPS (2005) growth rates. 
Compared to other countries, the size of civil service in Uganda is rather small relative to 
its population.  For example, in neighboring Kenya central and local government civil 
servants account for around 1% of population while teachers account for another 1%.  In 
Africa the average share of central civil servants (only) in population is 1.1%, in Asia – 
also 1.1%; it’s higher in Latin America – 1.5%, and even more high in OECD countries – 
1.9% (Palacios and Whitehouse 2005).  Indeed a thorough benchmarking of the size of 
the Uganda civil service population would require comparing whether countries have a 
centralized or decentralized governments.  Nevertheless, the comparison with Kenya 
(country with similar administrative structure and size of informal labor market) suggests 
that the size of the Uganda civil servant population is small.  Based on this information, it 
was assumed that in the long run the share of each group – civil servants and teachers – 
will gradually increase to around 1% of the population by around 2050 and will grow in 
line with population thereafter.  Compared to the observed trend around the world, this is 
a conservative assumption.  The projected growth of the total number of active 
employees in each of the sub-schemes is plotted in Figure 39. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Source: WB calculation based on PROST 
Changes in age and gender composition of active employees were modeled by defining 
the age and gender distribution of new recruits.  To derive the assumed age and gender 
profile of new employees, the actual data were smoothed with a five year moving average 
and recruitment after age 49 was eliminated, as shown in Figure 40 and Figure 41.  The 
share of women among new recruits is lower for civil servants (31%) than for teachers 
(38%).  New civil servants – both men and women – are also on average older than 
teachers: 33 and 31 years old for men and women, respectively among civil servants and 
28 and 26 years old for men and women, respectively, among teachers.  With no 
information on future policy regarding age and gender of newly hired employees, we 
assumed that in the future the age profile and the gender composition of new recruits 
remain the same.   
A scenario with higher activity rates for women in the medium- to longer term may be 
considered in further simulations.  The impact of the recruitment policy aimed at 
increasing the share of females is not obvious.  On the one hand, women tend to live 
longer
35 and therefore collect their pensions for more years than men which may increase 
the overall pension liabilities in a defined benefit system.  On the other hand, pension 
liabilities may increase to a lesser extent or even decrease if women’s wages remain 
lower than that of men.   
                                                 
35 For the population as a whole, female life expectancy in 2003 is 5% higher than men life expectancy.  In 
2075, female life expectancy is projected to be 14% higher than men life expectancy see section 0 on 
population mortality assumptions. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Source: WB calculations based on actual data 
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Modeling changes in the number of retirees 
Changes in the number of old age pensioners were modeled by using the flow method 
(see APPENDIX D for details) via setting the number of new retirees by age and gender 
as percentage of previous year’s contributors.  These percentages show the probability of 
an active employee of a particular age and gender to retire in the next year.   
As mentioned in Section III.A, the available data on the flows of retirees were not 
segregated by beneficiary category and could only partially be used for deriving the 
retirement pattern for new old age pensioners.  In accordance with the current law, it was 
assumed that individuals retire between age 45 and 61.  Based on the available data for 
PSPF and data for some other pension schemes with early retirement arrangements, the 
retirement probabilities were assumed to increase with age as shown in Figure 42 and 
Figure 43.  Same retirement pattern was used for both genders in both sub-schemes.  
Applying such retirement rates essentially results in the average retirement age varying 
within quite a narrow corridor between 53 and 54 for both genders and in both sub-
schemes. 













45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61
Age
 
Notes: * Percentage of the respective age and gender cohort of the covered population 
Source: WB calculations based on actual data 
The second beneficiary category – survivors – was modeled in a more aggregated way.  
As there was no reason to believe that the number of survivors as a share of the total 
covered population will significantly change over time, it was assumed to remain at the 
current level of 2.7% for civil servants and 0.3% for teachers.  This assumption can be 
reconsidered in further simulations. 
The projected number of beneficiaries in each of the modeled sub-schemes is plotted in 
Figure 43. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
All assumptions used in the simulations were discussed and validated by MPS officials.   
Modeling benefits 
Benefits are recalculated each year by using indexation rules and adding entry pensions 
of new retirees.  As mentioned before, in the baseline scenario it is assumed that 
everybody chooses a CPG and a reduced pension.   
According to the current rules, pensions are indexed to wages with the indexation 
mechanism working as follows: wage indexation is applied to full pensions and the 
commuted part is not indexed, meaning that the reduced pension increases at a higher rate 
than the wage growth. 
This mechanism was approximated by modeling a case where everybody received full 
pension indexed to wages and another case where everybody received 1/3 of full pension 
not indexed at all and then subtracting appropriate second case outputs (pension 
payments and IPD) from the first case.  This approach can take care of pensions for those 
who retired after the base year.  Adjustments to wage indexation were used in the first 
years of the simulation period to take into account higher than wages growth rate for 
pensions of those who retired before the base year.  Restoration of pensions to full 
pension after 15 years was modeled in a separate case and then integrated into the 
outputs. 
Pensions for new old age retirees in the baseline scenario are modeled by applying the 
benefit formula currently set by law to individuals’ wages and years of service at the time 
of retirement.  CPG payments are also calculated by applying the existing formula which 
applies the same commutation factor of 15 to all retirees regardless of their age.  
Assumptions regarding years of service at retirement (Figure 44) are based on actual data An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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for the last five years.  The data did not show any significant difference between men 
versus women as well as civil servants versus teachers of the same age. 






























Source: WB calculations based on actual data 
In accordance with the current law, survivorship benefits are modeled to be 100% of old 
age pensions. 
 Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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APPENDIX B  INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE ON PUBLIC 
SERVICE PENSIONS ARRANGEMENTS  
In many ways, the financial stresses faced by civil service pension schemes are quite 
similar around the world.  Most countries had undergone extended periods of massive 
expansion of public employment, typically in the seventies and the eighties, immediately 
followed by periods of stabilization or even contraction in some instances.  Such a 
phenomenon is quite evident in that the ratio of pensioners to covered employees has 
been rising dramatically over the last decade.  This is further exacerbated by the use of 
liberal early retirement programs to reduce wage bill expenditure, resulting in an 
explosion of the pension expenditure of most countries.  The Uganda public service 
schemes have additional problems to most other civil servants systems in the world.  
Besides not being a contributory system (except for the urban authorities scheme), it has 
been accumulated arrears for several years and is currently not paying most of the due 
pension benefits.   
Since most of the civil service pension bill is paid (or supplemented) by government 
budgetary revenues, many of the solutions adopted are also similar to those of statutory 
national pension schemes.  It is therefore not surprising that reform policies designed to 
manage civil service pension expenditure do not differ markedly from measures used to 
restore fiscal balance in national pension systems.  As such, amendments/modifications 
to the provisions of civil service schemes that are being considered generally take the 
form of: (i) reducing pension liability through parametric changes (i.e., lowering benefit 
entitlements) ; (ii) gradually shifting a portion of the costs to the employees by increasing 
contribution rates (or implementing a contribution rate), or shifting towards some form of 
advance funding of benefit obligations; (iii) designing systems that allow greater pension 
portability; and (iv) harmonizing compensation components (cash pay and fringe 
benefits) to attract, retain and motivate civil servants. 
Reduce pension liability.  Many countries have undertaken steps to reduce their civil 
service pension liabilities by introducing higher retirement ages and/or longer service 
periods, increasing required employee contribution rates, lowering rates of benefit 
accrual, and changing the post-retirement indexation policy so that pensions will increase 
in accordance with price increase instead of wage increase.  Korea increased the 
employee share of the contributions, shifted from wage to price indexation and reduced 
benefit levels for new hires.  Italy also shifted from wage to price indexation and 
introduced limitations on early retirement.  Greece and Portugal all reduced the benefit 
accrual rates.  The latest reform proposals tabled by the Brazilian President included 
measures such as introduction of retirement ages (viz.  no age requirement under current 
provisions), pensions based on career average earnings (instead of final wage), and 
levying a 11 percent tax on pensions above a certain level.   
Advance funding or cost sharing with employees.  Civil service pension schemes in many 
countries, particularly in the South Asia and Africa regions, are often totally unfunded or 
there may be little or no reserves to back up the obligations.  Of late, several countries 
realized the need to analyze how to achieve some level of advance funding (at least 
partially) of benefit obligations.  This may take the form of requiring employees to 
contribute at a higher rate, governments to contribute systematically, and/or establishing An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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reserves so that investment earnings from pension funds can reduce the ultimate cost of 
the schemes.   
Pension portability.  Historically, civil service pension schemes were established as a 
form of reward for long service.  Hence most benefit designs for these schemes are 
“backloaded”, with little in terms of transfer of pension rights in case of early departure 
to encourage lifetime employment.  However, as countries develop socially and 
economically, what used to be reward for long service becomes a barrier to labor 
mobility – prohibiting the flexibility that is generally available through natural attrition to 
attract new blood which is vital to allow the civil service to be modernized for the 21
st 
century.  Beginning with the 1980s, many industrialized countries realized the need for 
the civil service to be modernized, and started a trend to integrate civil service pension 
systems with national social security systems.  Integration of civil service plan benefits 
into national social security plan benefits occurs to varying degrees in different countries.  
In the most complete sense of the term, total integration takes place when civil Servants 
are treated no differently from private sector employees, as in Argentina and Peru, and 
throughout eastern Europe where preferential schemes no longer exist.  A less complete 
form of integration occurs where a civil service pension system is operated by the State 
much like any other occupational pension plan in the private sector.  Examples of this 
type can be found in the United Kingdom, Japan and other industrialized countries.  
Overall, an increasing number of civil service plans are being integrated in one way or 
another into national pension systems.  In countries where integration has occurred, 60 of 
these integrated pension system frameworks were implemented after 1980.  The lack of 
preservation of pension rights and their full purchasing value, albeit not unique to 
Uganda, results in low civil service turnover, which limits the healthy intake of new 
talent and removal of non-performers at all levels of the civil service.  To remove these 
disincentives, concerted international efforts to provide greater portability of pension 
entitlements are underway – by integrating civil servants into the national retirement 
income scheme or introducing defined contribution schemes, or both. 
Some countries like Chile, Uruguay, Peru and Jordan have taken steps to terminate the 
civil service preferential scheme for new employees as part of the process of 
implementing pension reform for their national systems.  Others such as United States 
and Hong Kong
36 have established fully funded defined contribution schemes for new 
employees to allow for full portability of pension rights.  The latest addition to the list of 
countries establishing fully-funded defined contribution schemes is India, as announced 
by the Finance Minister in the budget speech in February 2001, 2002 and 2003, although 
details of the arrangements are still not known. 
Holistic civil service reform.  Instead of focusing exclusively on lowering the civil 
servants’ wage bill by downsizing the civil service workforce, an increasing number of 
countries have turned their efforts towards a more holistic approach – one that takes into 
consideration the total compensation package as well as other employment parameters.  
The analysis of civil service pension reform should therefore go beyond comparisons of 
                                                 
36 United States established its fully funded defined contribution system for civil servants in 1987; Hong 
Kong introduced amendments so that new entrants into the civil service will now be covered under the 
newly established defined contribution arrangement (2001) as well as the Mandatory Provident Fund for 
private sector workers. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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civil service pension provisions or cost-sharing arrangements between the State (as the 
employer) and the employee.  In order to gain a better understanding of the pension 
reform situation in any country, one needs to study additional elements such as (i) public-
private wage rates and earnings; (ii) different kinds of fringe benefits including free (or 
below cost) medical services; and (iii) working conditions and stability of employment.  
Hong Kong provides the most recent example of a region that has undergone a thorough 
reform of its civil service, by carefully studying its human resource policies including 
appointments, pay and benefits, promotion and exit policies.  Such a holistic approach 
takes into consideration the proper apportionment between cash pay and fringe benefits, 
its comparability with the private sector, as well as other public sector remuneration 
policies around the world. 
Building a trustworthy, effective and efficient civil service.  As Uganda moves forward 
into a new era, civil servants are expected to become more efficient and effective to keep 
pace with the needs and demands of the communities they serve.  It is also the 
government’s duty to ensure that management and administration within the civil service 
will be transparent and trustworthy.  Simply reducing the pensions of civil servants (or 
keeping accumulating arrears), to abate any emerging fiscal crisis may demoralize 
workers and lead to adverse behavior, such as lack of accountability, deterioration in 
productivity and a passive attitude to responsibilities.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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APPENDIX C IMPLICIT PENSION DEBT: CROSS COUNTRY 
COMPARISON
37  
The IPD represents a fiscal burden that cannot be ignored in low- and middle-income 
countries.  Indeed, it is important to take into account unfunded public pension liabilities 
as part of an assessment of the overall fiscal situation, including the fiscal positions of 
pension schemes pre and post reforms. 
However, it is important to highlight that this indicator has different methodologies and 
assumptions and there is no standard way of calculation, hence careful consideration 
should be given to cross-country comparisons.  The estimates are quite sensitive to 
methodology and definitions.   
The definition of the IPD used in this paper represents the present value of pensions to be 
paid in the future on the basis of accrued rights by the year for which IPD is calculated; 
neither future contributions, nor the accrual of new rights on the basis of these 
contributions are considered (the value is assumed under the assumption that the systems 
closes today ). 
Table below presents the IPD estimates for 35 low and middle income countries under 
alternative discount rate assumptions and compares them with official public debt, 
expenditure levels, and existing financial reserves (all in percent of GDP).  Several 
results stand out. 
First, the estimated IPD is large relative to national incomes in our sample of countries 
but there is a huge range.  Using the two percent discount rate, Brazil’s IPD is 500 
percent of GDP, ten times more than Morocco.  Even using the higher, five percent 
discount rate, 18 out of 35 countries had IPDs greater than national income. 
Not surprisingly, the former socialist countries and especially Central Europe, have the 
highest IPD burdens measured this way.  Of the 19 countries with IDPs of at least 200 
percent of GDP, 12 of them are from this region (using a discount rate of 2 percent).  This 
reflects the high labor force coverage that characterized countries in this region and 
relatively generous benefit levels, combined with an aging population.  Uruguay is 
another country with a large state apparatus and high social expenditure and has the 
oldest demographic structure in Latin America.  At the other end of the spectrum are 
younger countries like Senegal, Morocco and Uganda where coverage is much lower than 
what had been found in pre-transition Central Europe.  Nevertheless, the levels of 
pension debt even in these countries is too significant to ignore. 
                                                 
37 Source: Holzmann, Palacios, Zviniene, 2004 Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Table 20: Public debt, pension spending and implicit pension debt for 35 low and 
middle income countries for various years during the end-1990s and 2000 
IPD by discount rate  Country Public  debt 
1999/2000 
Pension 
Spending  2% 4% 5% 
  as share of GDP 
Brazil 33 9  500  330  275 
Macedonia 41  9  441 291 244 
Slovenia 25  11 429  298  255 
Romania 18  6  386  256  214 
Poland 43 12 379  261  220 
Ukraine 59  9  365  257  220 
Portugal 55  5  358  233  193 
Malta 56 5  356  234  194 
Slovakia 31  8  304  210  179 
Hungary 59  9  300  203  171 
Uruguay 45  14 295  214  187 
Kyrgyz Rep.  135  7  282  185  154 
Croatia 33 11 274  201  175 
Estonia 7  9 268  189  163 
Moldova 78  8  229  159  136 
Lithuania 28  7  221  155  134 
Nicaragua 109  2  220 131 104 
Turkey 65  5 217  146  123 
Costa Rica  34  2  203  121  97 
Philippines 71  1  185 107  81 
Iran 10  2  146  89  72 
Bolivia 56  4 111  73  62 
Argentina 53  5  106 85  78 
Ecuador 209  1  103 63  51 
Mexico 19  1 101  65  54 
Colombia 24  2  88 56  46 
Dominican Rep.  23  1  80  49  40 
Cape Verde  52  1  78  47  38 
Chile 9 7  77  60  53 
Senegal 78  2  73 51 44 
Mauritius 35  3  63 47 42 
El Salvador  22  2  60  43  37 
Peru 43 2 57  40  34 
Korea 33 1 57  33  26 
Morocco 79  1  50 32 26 
Sources: Own calculations and public debt data based on SAVEM tables (World Bank), At-a-glance tables 
prepared for the Annual Meetings (World Bank), and various IMF statistics on Article IV consultations. 
IPDs are high relative to conventionally defined public debt for most countries.  Only a 
few countries (Cape Verde, Ecuador, Korea, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru and Senegal) 
have higher explicit public debt than IPD even when using the 5 percent discount rate 
case.  This result highlights the importance of this indicator for a proper assessment of 
long-term fiscal sustainability.  It is also a measure of just how difficult a rapid shift from 
an unfunded system to a funded pension scheme would be in some countries.  Last but 
not least, these figures suggest that pension debt or wealth could be a significant factor in 
determining savings behavior in many developing countries. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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Beside maturity, differences in these ratios are also due to demographic aging patterns.  A 
higher old-age dependency ratio increases, other things equal, both the IPD and 
expenditure shares, but differences in future dependency ratios first impact IPD before 
also translating into higher pension expenditure shares.   
It is also important to note that alternative indexation of wage records and benefits 
changes the estimated IPDs but not dramatically in most countries.  Moving from wage to 
price indexation of benefits reduces IPD, on average, by some 15 to 20 percent, with a 
lower reduction the higher the discount rate.   
Current pension spending levels will fail to reflect reforms that are being gradually 
phased in or changes to indexation which have large compounded impacts.  The IPD 
numbers capture this, therefore providing a more accurate assessment of the long term 
burden compared across countries.
38 
                                                 
38 Another relevant measure for the purposes of assessing sustainability is the ratio of IPD to the wage bill 
subject to contributions.  Using this measure highlights the problems of poor countries such as Senegal in 
servicing its IPD despite having a relatively low IPD/GDP ratio.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
     
  - 96 -   
Table 21: Estimated IPD for 35 Low and Middle Income Countries - detailed results 
Country  Coverage in  Dependency ratio  Dependency  ratio  IPD IPD IPD IPD IPD IPD 
  population aged 20+  in base year (a)   in year 2050 (a)   wage/2%  price/2%  wage/4%  price/4%  wage/5%  price/5% 
              
Argentina  28  47  41  106  91 85 75 78 70 
Bolivia  18  16  24  111  92 73 65 62 55 
Brazil  34  28  62  500 362 330 248 275 211 
Cape  Verde  17  5  26  78 64 47 39 38 32 
Chile  35  13  42  77 64 60 50 53 45 
Colombia  22  5  56  88 73 56 48 46 39 
Costa Rica  33  4  52  203  163  121  100  97  80 
Croatia  59  35  72  274 205 201 156 175 139 
Dominican  Rep.  20  7  44  80 64 49 40 40 32 
Ecuador  17  9  39  103  78 63 49 51 40 
El  Salvador  17  10  47  60 46 43 34 37 29 
Estonia  89  44  81  268 213 189 155 163 135 
Hungary  78  43  70  300 212 203 150 171 128 
Iran 26  11  56  146  110  89  70  72  57 
Korea  22  1  54  57 35 33 21 26 17 
Kyrgyz  Rep.  70  30  60  282 230 185 154 154 129 
Lithuania  78  50  84  221 164 155 120 134 104 
Macedonia  49  23  77  441 356 291 241 244 204 
Malta  57  18  58  356 284 234 190 194 159 
Mauritius  100  11  60  63 46 47 37 42 33 
México  25  7  40  101  84 65 54 54 45 
Moldova  73  63  68  229 178 159 127 136 111 
Morocco  6  10  53  50 40 32 26 26 22 
Nicaragua  21  6  33  220 173 131 105 104  84 
Peru  51  6  26  57 51 40 35 34 30 
Philippines 41  2  41  185  146  107  85  81  66 
Poland  95  24  47  379 304 261 212 220 181 
Portugal  78  36  72  358 271 233 181 193 151 
Romania  53  45  121  386 292 256 199 214 169 
Senegal  6  39  78  73 51 51 37 44 32 
Slovakia  81  37  91  304 241 210 171 179 148 
Slovenia  76  33  96  429 314 298 226 255 197 
Turkey  35  28  50  217 154 146 109 123  93 
Ukraine  91  42  82  365 292 257 211 220 183 
Uruguay  52  40  61  295 246 214 182 187 160 
Notes: (a) Ratio of old age pensioners to contributors; (b) Indexation method applies both to the wage record valorization and to the indexation of pension benefit  
Source: World Bank Pension Database, and own calculations with PROST Model. An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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APPENDIX D OVERVIEW OF PROST 12 
The model consists of an input workbook and five output modules.  On the input side, the 
user provides country specific data on demographic, economic and pension system 
related parameters and assumptions about their behavior in the future.  This information 
is entered in the input file with six embedded worksheets: 
 
General  Economic variables (GDP and wage growth, inflation, interest 
rate), non age-specific pension system parameters (pension fund 
balance and benefit expenditure in the base year, retirement age, 
contribution rate, pension indexation rules, etc.) and some 
demographic variables; 
 
Population  Base year population by age and gender along with age-specific 
fertility and mortality rates and immigration information. 
 
Labor  Age and gender specific labor force participation and 
unemployment rates as well as distribution of wages and old age 
pensions across age and gender cohorts. 
 
Pension  Age and gender specific information about pension system 
contributors, beneficiaries, coverage and retirement rates, average 
years of service at retirement and replacement rates for new 
beneficiaries. 
 
Profiles  Information on representative individuals, such as gender, career 
path, individual wages, life expectancy, etc. 
 
Reform  Parameters relevant to systemic reforms to be simulated (any 
combination of conventional PAYG, fully funded DC and notional 
DC pillars), including switching pattern, how the acquired rights 
will be paid, contribution rates, rules for annuitization and pension 
payout under DC schemes and replacement rates/benefit formula in 
a PAYG pillar, indexation, etc. 
 
In the most simplified way the general calculation scheme can be summarized as 
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General Calculation Scheme 
 
PROST follows single age/gender cohorts over time and generates population 
projections, which, combined with labor market assumptions, are used to forecast future 
numbers of contributors and beneficiaries.  These in turn generate flows of revenues and 
expenditure.  The model then projects fiscal balances and calculates the implicit pension 
debt.  The required contribution rates and affordable replacement rates for zero pension 
fund balance in each year of the simulation period are also calculated.  Finally, PROST 
produces outputs related to individuals – what an individual would contribute to the 
system and what he/she obtain under PAYG DB and multipillar schemes.  This allows 
both intra- and intergenerational analysis. 
 
Depending on the characteristics of the pension system and data availability, the 
user can choose the method for calculation of some of the variables.  In particular, the 
number of contributors and beneficiaries can be computed in either “Stock” or “Flow” 
method.  With the “Stock” method, for each year the stocks of contributors/beneficiaries 
are calculated first and then inflows (new contributors/beneficiaries) are derived as the 
changes of the stocks: 
 
Inflow(a,t,g) = stock(a,t,g) – stock(a-1,t-1,g) + outflow(a,t,g)  
 
With the “Flow” method, inflows are calculated first and then stocks are derived 
as previous year’s stocks in each age/gender cohort adjusted for the net inflow (inflow-
outflow): 
 
Stock(a,t,g) = stock(a-1,t-1,g) -  outflow(a,t,g) + inflow(a,t,g)  
 
where a = age, t = year, g = gender 
 
As PROST keeps track of contribution years of service accrued by each cohort, 
the calculated number of new retirees – whatever method is used – is then adjusted so 
that the total length of service accrued by the cohort is equal to the total length of service 
Population
Contributors Beneficiaries
PF revenues PF expenditures
Economy
PF balance
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claimed by the cohort at the time of retirement.  After the number of new retirees is 
adjusted, the stock is recalculated using the “Flow” method. 
 
The user can also choose how the benefit of new beneficiaries is specified - via 
benefit formula or via age and gender specific replacement rates. 
 
As mentioned above, output produced by PROST is organized in five output 
modules.  Each of the modules contains a number of Excel worksheets and a graphical 
summary on key output indicators: 
 
Population Projection  Population projections and pyramids, life tables, life 
expectancy changes, population dependency rates, etc.   
 
Demographic Structure    Labor force and employment projections, projections of 
contributors and beneficiaries, demographic structure of the 
pension system, and system dependency rates. 
 
Finances of  Monopillar   Macroeconomic trends, wage projections, pension  benefit  
PAYG   projections for the existing and new pensioners, revenue 
and expenditure of the pension system, required 
adjustments to contribution rates and replacement rates for 
zero current balance, and the implicit pension debt.   
 
Finances of Multipillar  Pension benefit projections for new and existing pensioners 
System  under each of the three pillars (conventional PAYG, 
notional PAYG, and funded DC), revenues and expenditure 
of both PAYG and funded pillars, implicit pension debt of 
the PAYG system after the reform, and results of the 
reform (compares benefit projections and financial standing 
under the monopillar PAYG and multipillar scenarios). 
 
Individual accounts   Lifetime contributions and benefits and individual related 
summary statistics for up to six different individuals 
specified in the “Profiles” input sheet under PAYG system 
(statutory, with adjusted contribution rates and with 
adjusted benefits) and multipillar system (for those who 
switched to the multipillar system and those who remained 
in the PAYG system). Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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APPENDIX E  IMPACT OF REFORMS ON INDIVIDUALS 
Considerations on pension benefit adequacy, distributional and equity issues are as 
important in the assessment of pension reform options as considerations on financial 
sustainability, affordability and fiscal impact.  Individuals with four different profiles 
representing the four different groups of employees were modeled to compare how they 
would fare under each of the reform options presented in the paper: (1) a pure DC reform 
(referred to in the paper as Reform I), and (2) a hybrid reform (referred to as Reform II).  
Since in funded DC schemes benefits are very sensitive to the interest rate earned on 
individual accounts, variants with 5% and 3% real rate of return on assets were 
considered for each reform option. 
The study targeted individuals of different gender and – within each gender group – 
with different job entry ages, income level, earning profile, and mortality rates.  The 
specific individual profiles were selected in consultations with and based on the data 
provided by our Ugandan counterparts from the MPS.  Four types of individuals specified 
by entry age, income level, and life expectancy were considered for each gender.   
1)  Lifetime low income worker (approximating the average career of a Teacher or 
Policeman): 
a)  Starts working at age 18 and retires at 60; 
b)  Wage starts at about 50% of the age/gender cohort average and sustains that ratio 
throughout the person’s career; 
c)  Individual’s life expectancy is assumed to be lower than for the respective age 
and gender group of the general population by applying 110% adjustment 
coefficient to mortality rates. 
2)  Lifetime average income worker (approximating the average career of a Head 
Teacher): 
a)  Starts working at age 20 and retires at 60; 
b)  Earns age/gender cohort average wage throughout his/her career; 
c)  Individual life expectancy is assumed to be equal to the respective age and gender 
group’s average. 
3)  Lifetime high income worker (approximating the average career of a Commissioner): 
a)  Starts working at age 25 (after getting higher education) and retires at 60; 
b)  Wage starts at about 150% and increases to about 250%  of the age/gender cohort 
average by the end of the person’s career; 
c)  Individual life expectancy is assumed to be higher than for the respective age and 
gender group of the general population by applying 90% adjustment coefficient to 
mortality rates. 
4)  High income worker with a steep earning profile (approximating the average career of 
a Permanent Secretary): 
a)  Starts working at age 20 and retires at 60; An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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b)  Wage starts at 100% and increases to about 300%  of the gender/cohort average 
by the end of the person’s career; 
c)  Individual life expectancy is assumed to be higher than for the respective age and 
gender group of the general population by applying 90% adjustment coefficient to 
mortality rates. 
These four representative individuals are assumed to retire at the statutory retirement age 
of 60.  This is motivated by the fact that in all reform scenarios participants are 
discouraged from early retirement by the close link generated between benefits and 
contributions.  Life expectancy is modeled to be correlated to income level, in accordance 
with the observed tendencies around the world.  Since currently the Government is only 
considering pension reform options affecting only new entrants in the labor force, the 
four representative individuals described above are assumed to join the system in the year 
2007 – the reform year.  The real discount rate used in all present value calculations is 
5%.   
We initially assess the impact of the reforms in terms of relative pension levels and 
pension wealth in relation to the status quo: the no-reform or baseline scenario.  
Subsequently we compare the results of the two reform option: the pure DC and the 
hybrid reforms. 
Relative pension levels are reported below in Figure 45 and Figure 46.  Relative pension 
level is defined as the individual pension at retirement divided by the economy-wide 
average wage.  Figure 45 reports the relative pension levels projected for our four 
different types under the no-reform – baseline – scenario modeled in the main body of 
this paper.  Figure 46 reports relative pension levels projected for our four different types 
under the reform scenarios modeled in the main body of this paper.   Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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Figure 45: Projected Pension Entitlements as a Proportion of the Average 
Wage
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Source: WB calculations 
Figure 46: Projected Pension Entitlements as a Proportion of the Average 
Wage
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Source: WB calculations 
                                                 
39 The average wage for civil servants in the year of individual’s retirement 
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All income and gender groups would receive significantly higher benefits under the 
current generous system if no reform is introduced.  With no minimum pension, no 
ceilings on pensionable wages and with individual’s last wage used as the wage base in 
pension calculations, relative pension levels linearly increase with individual pre-
retirement wage in the no-reform scenario – the current situation.  This type of a system 
favors higher income workers, especially those with steeper individual earning profile.   
The introduction of any of the two reform options results in a considerable reduction of 
expected benefits across all income groups and for both genders compared to the no-
reform option.  At the same time, the extent to which individuals are affected by reforms 
varies substantially depending on individual’s pre-retirement income level.  In addition, 
since both the pure DC and the hybrid system reform options establish a close link 
between individual’s benefit and lifetime earnings, the reduction in expected benefits is 
stronger for individuals with higher pre-retirement income.
41 This is shown in Figure 47 
where in both reform options, the higher the individual’s last wage, the higher the 
difference in relative pension levels relative to the no-reform scenario. 
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Source: WB calculations 
Another useful indicator in the analysis of the impact of reforms on individuals is pension 
wealth which is calculated as the present value at retirement of future pension benefits.  
While replacement rates and relative pension levels measure the value of benefits per 
time unit, pension wealth quantifies what an individual would expect to receive from the 
pension system over his lifetime at retirement.  The usefulness of pension wealth is 
                                                 
41 Higher pre-retirement income is determined by longer working life, higher wage levels, higher wage 
growth or any combination of these factors. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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related to the fact that, contrary to the relative pension level, it captures the effect of 
changes in benefit indexation with the reform. 
As done before, pension wealth under the reform scenarios is compared with the no-
reform pension wealth benchmark in Figure 48.  Notice that the pension wealth in the 
reform scenarios falls in relative terms by more than the relative pension level as with the 
reform post-retirement pension indexation changes from wage to prices. 
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Source: WB calculations 
We now compare the results for the two reform options. 
When the two reform options are compared, low income workers will be better off under 
the hybrid scheme than under the pure DC option, regardless of the assumed interest rate 
earned on individual accounts.  With no minimum pension guarantee in the pure DC 
reform option, the expected benefit for this group may drop below 20% of the average 
wage.  Even under the optimistic scenario of 5% real rate of return on investments they 
can get only about 30% of the average wage which is lower than what most countries 
target as the as a minimum pension.  On the contrary, the hybrid scheme option may 
significantly reduce investment risk for low income earners, providing at the same time 
an acceptable benefit level of 43-44% of the average wage. 
Under the more optimistic scenario (5% real interest rate), the expected benefits for the 
average income group in the pure DC system will be very similar to those in the hybrid 
system: 60% of the average wage for men and 55% for women in the pure DC option 
versus 57% for men and 55% for women in the hybrid option.  But, in the likely event of 
lower interest rates (3% real), this group will do much better under the hybrid scheme – 
36%/32% versus 54%/52% respectively.  Though in the hybrid scheme average wage An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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earners remain exposed to investment risk, variations in the interest rate have much less 
impact on benefits compared to the pure DC option.   
For higher income groups, the pure DC system may look more attractive than the hybrid 
scheme, but only under the optimistic scenario with respect to the interest rate earned on 
individual accounts.  If the real rate of return on assets sustains at 5% throughout their 
career, the two top income groups can get from 100% to 113% of the average wage, 
whereas under the hybrid reform option their expected benefits are by 5-10 percentage 
points lower.  On the contrary, under the less optimistic scenario these groups will be 
better off in the hybrid scheme: 78%-88% in the hybrid versus 63%-73% in the pure DC 
scheme. 
Another indicator that can be used to compare the pure DC reform option with the hybrid 
reform option is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR).  In a contributory system workers are 
supposed to pay contributions, in which case their participation in the pension system can 
be considered as an investment.  Hence, the IRR can be used as a comprehensive measure 
of the level of benefits that an individual would obtain relative to what he/she would pay 
into the system in the form of contributions.
42 This indicator takes into account 
individual’s overall wage and contribution history, retirement age and expected number 
of years in retirement, initial benefit and its post-retirement indexation.  Table 22 
summarizes projected IRRs by gender and income group. 
Table 22: Projected Internal Rates of Return 
men women men women men women men women
Pure DC-5 % 7.3% 7.1% 7.5% 7.3% 7.8% 7.6% 7.7% 7.7%
Pure DC-3 % 5.0% 4.7% 5.3% 5.0% 5.6% 5.4% 5.5% 5.5%
Hybrid-5 % 8.9% 8.9% 7.8% 7.8% 7.7% 7.6% 7.7% 7.8%
Hybrid-3 % 8.9% 8.9% 7.5% 7.6% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.9%
Reform option
Income category
low average high steep career
 
Source: WB calculations 
Under the more optimistic interest rate scenario (5% real), high income groups may 
expect about the same rate of return by participating in either of the two schemes.  For 
average wage earners hybrid scheme seems to be slightly more attractive, and for the low 
income group the IRR in the hybrid scheme exceeds what they may expect from a pure 
DC scheme by 22-26%.  Under the less optimistic interest rate (3% real), all income 
groups benefit from participation in the hybrid scheme: the lower the income, the higher 
the IRR in the hybrid relative to the pure DC scheme.   
Overall, the hybrid scheme reduces the investment risk for all contributors: the lower the 
income, the lower is the investment risk under the two-pillar compared to the pure DC 
option.  Thus, more income security for system participants can be achieved through risk 
diversification in the hybrid reform option.  In addition, it provides higher benefits for the 
lifetime poor relative to what they may get from the monopillar DC scheme.  While in the 
latter the rate of returns are very similar across all income groups as well as across 
                                                 
42 Obviously, the IRR cannot be calculated for the baseline scenario as under the status quo, the system is 
non-contributory. Tatyana Bogomolova, Gregorio Impavido, Montserrat Pallares-Miralles 
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genders, in the former there is some redistribution from higher to lower income groups 
through it’s first pillar.   An Assessment Of Reform Options For The Public Service Pension Fund In Uganda 
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APPENDIX F  IMPACT OF WAGE INDEXATION 
One possible measure to reduce financial burden without introducing any radical changes 
to the existing PAYG defined benefit system is switching from wage to price indexation.  
By changing the rules for recalculation of post-retirement benefits, this measure does not 
affect pensions of new retirees, but results in lower average pensions for the stock of 
beneficiaries.  Once the impact reaches its full range in about 30 years, the average 
replacement rates for all existing old age pensioners decrease by about 10-12 percentage 
points compared to what the retirees may expect from wage indexation (Figure 1).  At the 
same time, even with price indexation, benefits remain at a relatively high level of about 
55-60% of the average wage. 
Figure 49: Projected average replacement rates* for the stock of retirees 










Notes: * Ratio of the total number of beneficiaries in all categories to the total number of active employees. 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
However, price indexation alone can not be sufficient to resolve the key problems with 
the current scheme.  Even though in the long run the total expenditures will decrease by 
10%-12%, they will continue to grow as a share of GDP – from the current 1% to about 
4% (two sub-schemes combined).  Figure 2 compares projected expenditures with wage 
and price indexation.   











Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
With price indexation, the sustainable contribution rates can be reduced only from 33% to 
30% for civil servants and from 40% to 36% for teachers.  The financing gap is projected 
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year GDP from 53% and 55% from 60% for civil servants and teachers respectively.  The 
impact of price versus wage indexation on the IPD is compared in Figure 3. 











Notes: * liabilities accrued by the system at a given point in time 
Source: WB calculations based on PROST 
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